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[53] 
Patent-Eligible Inventions After Bilski:  
History and Theory 
Joshua D. Sarnoff* 
The U.S. Supreme Court has continued to require that patentable subject-matter 
eligibility determinations be made by reference to three historic, categorical exclusions 
(scientific principles, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas), which must be treated as 
if already known even when newly discovered by the applicant. Various thoughtful 
scholars have alternatively urged that these exclusions should be viewed restrictively or 
that such eligibility decisions should be avoided. But these scholars underappreciate the 
systemic and social benefits of categorical exclusions, and particularly of treating these 
categories as if they were already known prior art. In any event, the Federal Circuit, the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, and the public must now draw lines between eligible 
inventions and ineligible applications of excluded discoveries. 
 
This Article supplies a history and theory of subject-matter eligibility to guide such line 
drawing, based on the recognition that (for both eligibility and patentability) the Patent 
Act has always required, and still requires, creative, human invention in the application 
of such categorically excluded discoveries. So long as these basic discoveries continue 
to be treated as if already known, relying on threshold eligibility determinations will 
improve efficiency and reduce patent-system errors. Supplying clearer criteria for the 
additional creativity required for eligibility will further reduce overall patent-system 
burdens and will better direct investment, effort, invention, and disclosure towards 
more creative, patentable applications. 
 
These categorical eligibility exclusions were justified historically on both deontological 
and utilitarian moral grounds. Prudence counsels retaining them, given the high social 
stakes involved, the lack of theoretical or empirical demonstration that competing 
innovation approaches are better, and the moral concerns that would be raised by their 
elimination. The Article thus concludes with an exhortation to celebrate rather than to 
reluctantly embrace categorical exclusions of patentable subject matter, their prior-art 
status, and the line drawing that eligibility determinations require, to better protect the 
public domain of science, nature, and ideas while simultaneously improving the patent 
system. 
 
 * Associate Professor, DePaul University College of Law, Chicago, Illinois. The Author was 
counsel of record for law professors in the Prometheus Laboratories case and for law professors and 
AARP in the Bilski case in the Supreme Court and in the Federal Circuit, and co-counsel for the 
American Medical Association and other medical organizations in the Myriad Genetics case in the 
Federal Circuit and in the district court. The Author thanks the many people who have contributed to 
this Article at different stages of the process. The Article originated as a draft presented at the Oracle 
Corporation-George Washington University Law School Symposium What’s Ahead on Highway 101 
(Nov. 3, 2006). A more extensive historical treatment is the subject of a forthcoming book, Joshua D. 
Sarnoff, Patents and Morality: Religion, Science, Nature, and the Law (forthcoming). Finally, 
this Article is dedicated to the memory and legacy of Edward C. Walterscheid. 
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Introduction 
Legal line drawing is difficult. But it is even more difficult without a 
theory of why the lines are being drawn, what they are supposed to fence 
in and out, and whether categorical exclusions are preferable to case-by-
case rejections. This is the current state of uncertainty in the United 
States in regard to eligible subject matter under section 101 of the Patent 
Act
1
 and its relationship to various patentability doctrines following 
Bilski v. Kappos.
2
 In Bilski, the Supreme Court by the narrowest of 
majorities approved of treating business methods as patent-eligible 
inventions, while noting that such claims “raise special problems in terms 
of vagueness and suspect validity” and that without a “high enough 
bar . . . patent examiners and courts could be flooded with claims that 
would put a chill on creative endeavor and dynamic change.”
3
 The Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is now issuing a burgeoning set of 
eligibility decisions regarding a wide range of practical and useful 
applications including software, in Research Corporation Technologies;
4
 
medical treatment, in Prometheus Laboratories, which is currently under 
review by the Supreme Court;
5
 and isolated genetic sequences, in the 
Myriad Genetics case.
6
 In Myriad Genetics, the federal government 
admitted that it has routinely issued patents for isolated and purified 
genetic sequences even though it lacks the legislative authority to treat 
them as patent-eligible inventions;
7
 this was not the first time the 
government may have made such errors regarding purified materials.
8
 
The Supreme Court in Bilski reiterated, as a matter of long-standing 
precedent and stare decisis, that the patent system categorically excludes 
“laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas”
9
 (referred to as 
 
 1. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 2. 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 3. Id. at 3228–29. 
 4. Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 5. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. 
granted, 131 S. Ct. 3027 (2011). 
 6. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) [hereinafter “Myriad Genetics”]. 
 7. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 18, Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (No. 2010-1406); see also id. at 17–36. 
 8. See generally P.J. Federico, Louis Pasteur’s Patents, 86 Science 327 (1937) (citing Am. Fruit 
Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1 (1931); Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 
(S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912)) (discussing the Pasteur yeast 
patent as a purified biological material, Judge Learned Hand’s famous decision justifying patents for 
purified chemical materials as new and different things, and an intervening Supreme Court decision 
that clarified eligibility limits, which he recognized made it doubtful that such subject matter could be 
patented); Jon M. Harkness, Dicta on Adrenalin(e): Myriad Problems with Learned Hand’s Product-
of-Nature Pronouncements in Parke-Davis v. Mulford, J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y (forthcoming 
2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1881193 (examining the context 
in which the patent dispute between Parke-Davis and Mulford arose). 
 9. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010); see Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 
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“science, nature, and ideas”), despite the broad categorical language of 
eligible subject matter recited in section 101.
10
 Various thoughtful scholars 
have recently argued that we should view these exclusions from eligibility 
restrictively to avoid excluding from the patent system “whole fields of 
endeavor,”
11
 that we should focus principally on claim scope
12
 and should 
rely principally on other patentability doctrine policy levers to constrain 
improper access to the patent system,
13
 or that we should avoid eligibility 
decisions entirely.
14
 The Federal Circuit under Chief Judge Rader has 
signaled its desire to avoid both the “abstract idea” category and reliance 
on eligibility doctrine, requiring that “this disqualifying characteristic 
should exhibit itself so manifestly as to override the broad statutory 
categories of eligible subject matter and the statutory context that directs 




Avoiding categorical eligibility decisions would preserve patent 
claims for case-by-case validity evaluations under patentability standards 
such as novelty, non-obviousness, and adequacy of the disclosure,
16
 which 
these judges and scholars presumably believe impose better line-drawing 
criteria. Implicit in this approach is the view that section 101 largely 
duplicates patentability criteria that avoid “the issuance of bad patents”—
bad in the sense of not being “really innovative”
17
—and that there is no 
field of scientific, technological, or other functional endeavor for which 
the patent system would categorically impede rather than promote 
 
(1980) (citing, inter alia, O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112–21 (1853); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 
U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1853)). 
 10. “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter . . . may obtain a patent therefor . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 11. John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of Patentability, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 
609, 613 (2009). 
 12. See Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 1315, 1317 (2011). 
 13. See id. at 1326–27; cf. Duffy, supra note 11, at 623 (arguing that if a class of patents complies 
with the non-obviousness requirement but nevertheless “discourages or impedes the development and 
spread of useful knowledge,” patentability doctrines rather than exclusions can be changed; in 
contrast, patent law has no remedy for the loss of patents and inventions that are excluded but would 
meet non-obviousness and other requirements). See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy 
Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1575 (2003). 
 14. See, e.g., Michael Risch, Everything Is Patentable, 75 Tenn. L. Rev. 591, 591–93 (2008) 
[hereinafter Risch, Everything Is Patentable]; cf. Duffy, supra note 11, at 615 (arguing that unless 
courts can create eligibility rules that are both durable and sustainable they should abandon attempts 
to adopt crisp rules). 
 15. Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 16. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103(a), 112 (2006). 
 17. Stefania Fusco, In re Bilski: A Conversation with Judge Randall Rader and a First Look at the 
BPAI’s Cases, 20 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 123, 145 (2010). See Michael Risch, Forward to the Past, 2009–
2010 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 333, 348 [hereinafter Risch, Forward to the Past] (noting that, during the 
Bilski oral arguments, some Supreme Court Justices were concerned with eliminating “‘bad’ patents 
but keep[ing] ‘good’ patents”). 
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innovation.
18
 Because section 101 supposedly performs no unique or 
useful role in placing fences at the borders of the patent system, there is 
arguably no good reason to exclude from the patent system any field of 
endeavor dealing with practical and useful knowledge. Rather, the only 
productive role for eligibility is supposedly to exclude from the patent 
system claims that are clearly overly broad compared to the inventive 
contributions made by the claimants, that is, fundamental knowledge 
that has not yet been developed into any practical and useful 
application.
19




Significantly, these critics overstate the risk of exclusion errors and 
inadequately appreciate a fundamental aspect of current eligibility 
doctrine, as well as the historic justifications for it and the current 
benefits it supplies. This aspect renders reliance solely on patentability 
standards to constrain the patent system both inefficient and morally 
suspect. Thus, the Supreme Court in Bilski not only reaffirmed the 
existence of the categorical exclusions from eligibility, but also reiterated 
the long-standing requirement to treat such ineligible science, nature, 
and ideas as if they were already “a familiar part of the prior art,”
21
 even 
when they are newly discovered by the patent claimant. This legal fiction 
exists because such discoveries must remain free for all to use as “the 
‘basic tools of scientific and technological work.’”
22
 Without prior-art 
treatment, the public domain of science, nature, and ideas could be 
consumed piecemeal, even if the new discoveries could not be swallowed 
whole. The patent system is not supposed to reward discoveries of basic 
science and at least some other kinds of human discoveries,
23
 no matter 
 
 18. For example, Chief Judge Rader “strongly opposed the possibility” that the “patent system is 
not optimal to foster innovation in the newest technologies and that incentives for inventions in these 
fields should be found elsewhere.” Fusco, supra note 17, at 144; see, e.g., Duffy, supra note 11, at 618 
(noting the lack of empirical data and knowledge sufficient to create patentable subject-matter rules to 
exclude patents that “would too often severely interfere with, or discourage, development and the 
further spread of useful knowledge itself” (quoting Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 
Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 127–28 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 19. See, e.g., Lemley et al., supra note 12, at 1328–29 (discussing “fundamental” ideas “reserved to 
society” that are the “building blocks of human thought” and noting that a “patent claim is ‘too broad’ 
in the sense that it encroaches upon society’s right to unfettered access” to such fundamental ideas); 
id. at 1329 (“The worry is not that an inventor controls the application of an abstract idea, but only 
that an inventor obtains rights over the idea itself.”). 
 20. See, e.g., Risch, Everything Is Patentable, supra, note 14, at 595 (“[A]bandoning subject matter 
restrictions in favor of rigorous application of patentability requirements will not necessarily lead to 
more patents in controversial areas.”). 
 21. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 592 (1978); see Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010); 
Parker, 437 U.S. at 591 (citing Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); 
Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939)). 
 22. Flook, 437 U.S. at 591–92 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). 
 23. See, e.g., Hector M. Holmes, Book Review, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1431, 1432 (1932) (reviewing 
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how much money, effort, creativity, and disclosure went into developing 
and disseminating that highly useful knowledge. Subject-matter eligibility 
doctrine polices precisely these distinctions regarding the kinds of 
activities that the intellectual property law system should and should not 
reward.
24
 We should accept no substitutes. 
Doctrinally, both eligibility and patentability continue to require an 
“invention,”
25
 even when the claims might otherwise meet the language 
of the statutory categories or other requirements.
26
 As a result of the 
prior-art status of categorically excluded science, nature, and ideas, the 
human creativity involved in discovering them does not contribute to 
assessing the nature, eligibility, or patentability of any claimed invention 
in an application.
27
 Rather, patent claimants must invent, disclose, and 
claim some “other inventive concept” than a merely novel, physically 
limited application of a new discovery.
28
 Stated differently, for an eligible 
and patentable invention to exist, there must be creativity in the 
application of excluded discoveries. Mere novelty of the application is 
not enough. For this reason, the Court in Bilski repeated language from 
 
C.J. Hamson, Patent Rights for Scientific Discoveries (1930)); see also In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 
1553–54 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Archer, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting that 
embodying creative new music in a piano roll will not make the machine-readable music a patent-
eligible invention). But cf. Peter Lee, Note, Patents, Paradigm Shifts, and Progress in Biomedical 
Science, 114 Yale L.J. 659, 661–63 (2004) (arguing that strong patent rights induce hypothesis 
generation to develop new scientific paradigms and that research tools raise the costs of exploring 
existing paradigms). See generally C.J. Hamson, Patent Rights for Scientific Discoveries 20–29 
(1930). 
 24. See, e.g., Dennis S. Karjala, Distinguishing Patent and Copyright Subject Matter, 35 Conn. L. 
Rev. 439, 440–41 (2003) (discussing omissions from copyright and patentable subject matter, sui 
generis protections, and dual coverage regarding things “thought to be worthy of protection”); cf. 17 
U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (requiring “original works of authorship” and providing an illustrative list); 
Malla Pollack, Towards a Feminist Theory of the Public Domain, or Rejecting the Gendered Scope of 
United States Copyrightable and Patentable Subject Matter, 12 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 603, 604–05 
(2006) (discussing historically gendered exclusions from patentable subject-matter protection). 
 25. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, 112 (2006). See generally Giles S. Rich, Laying the Ghost of the 
“Invention” Requirement, 1 APLA Q.J. 26 (1972–1973) (discussing efforts to adopt new terminology in 
the 1952 Act). Congress could easily have amended section 101 to refer to whoever applies for a 
patent (meeting other requirements), rather than to whoever invents. Email from Richard Stern to the 
IPProfs listserv (Aug. 3, 2011) (on file with the Author). 
 26. Cf. Emir Aly Crowne Mohammed, What Is an Invention? A Review of the Literature on 
Patentable Subject Matter, 15 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 1, 2 (2008) (“[Commentators have] questioned 
whether there still needs to be an invention in the first place, before one even considers its 
patentability.”); David Vaver, Invention in Patent Law: A Review and a Modest Proposal, 11 Int’l J.L. 
& Info. Tech. 286, 289–90 (2003) (evaluating the meaning of invention by reference to international 
treaty norms). 
 27. See, e.g., O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 115–16 (1853); Morton v. N.Y. Eye 
Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879, 881–82 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 9865). 
 28. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978); see Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010) 
(“[O]nce that algorithm [wa]s assumed to be within the prior art, the application, considered as a 
whole, contain[ed] no patentable invention.” (emphasis added) (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 594) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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its most recent (and most claimant-friendly) eligibility case, Diamond v. 
Diehr, stating that “the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas 
‘cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use . . . to a particular 




Given the private benefits to be obtained from acquiring patents on 
novel applications of categorically excluded discoveries of science, 
nature, and ideas, we will increasingly confront claims that stretch the 
boundaries of our patent system.
30
 Given this expansion and the Supreme 
Court’s continued reliance on patent eligibility doctrine, the lower 
courts, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), and the public will 
inevitably focus on this area of the law. So long as new discoveries of 
science, nature, and ideas are treated as if they were prior art, however, 
concerns over “preempting” all uses of these discoveries will remain 
incoherent.
31
 Similarly, without excluding any of the creativity involved in 
making the ineligible discovery, concerns regarding the overbreadth of 
claims relative to their “practical, real-world contribution”
32
 will continue 
to fail to supply an adequate theory of line drawing.
33
 
In contrast, recognizing the prior-art status of discoveries and the 
need for invention in the application explains the origins of the Court’s 
current doctrinal formulations for determining the eligibility of 
particular, physical, and scope-limited claims incorporating or applying 
ineligible discoveries.
34
 These tests are whether claimed products have 
“markedly different characteristics”
35
 and whether claimed processes 
reflect non-analogous uses.
36
 Further, embracing prior-art status and line 
drawing will permit better tailoring of patent eligibility doctrine, as 
judges will be forced to clarify the kinds and degrees of creativity that 
 
 29. 130 S. Ct. at 3230 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191–92 (1981)). 
 30. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property 
Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 577, 591 (1999) 
(noting that due to expansion of patentable subject matter, “concerns about quality, especially in light 
of the data on overall volume, point to one conclusion: the patent system is in crisis”). 
 31. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3230 (noting earlier concerns that a patent “would wholly pre-empt 
the [discovery] and in practical effect would be a patent on the [discovery] itself”) (quoting Gottschalk 
v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972)); id. at 3231 (allowing the claimed patent for “risk hedging would 
pre-empt use of this approach in all fields, and would effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract 
idea”). 
 32. Lemley et al., supra note 12, at 1317; see, e.g., Michael Risch, New Uses for Patent Utility 13–
18 (July 27, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Risch, New Uses for Patent Utility], available 
at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/bclt_IPSC2010_Risch.pdf.  
 33. Cf. Elizabeth I. Winston, The Technological Edge, Akron J. Intell. Prop. L. (forthcoming 
2011) (manuscript at 8), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1692836 (“[T]o draw a line between 
products of nature and man-made manipulations . . . requires analysis of the degree of sophistication 
required to produce the end product.”). 
 34. See infra Part I.B. 
 35. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980). 
 36. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co. v. Elec. Supply Co., 144 U.S. 11, 18 (1892). 
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should be required.
37
 As recognized by the four concurring Justices in 
Bilski, the majority wholly failed to explain why the relatively specific 
claims at issue, which applied the basic concept of hedging in a putatively 
novel and restrictive context, were abstract ideas.
38
 The majority also 
failed to explain why the even more specific dependent claims, which 
limited the applications to commodities and energy markets and required 
the use of well-known data-gathering and calculation techniques as 
inputs to the method, added only “field of use” limits or “token 
postsolution components” that “did not make the concept patentable.”
39
 
The Federal Circuit’s en banc approach fared no better. It improperly 
adopted the Supreme Court’s “machine-or-transformation test as the 
sole test for what constitutes [an eligible] ‘process’ (as opposed to just an 
important and useful clue),”
40
 and failed to explain the kind and degree 
of transformation that was necessary and sufficient for eligibility.
41
 
Line drawing in the medical and biotechnological fields also will 
remain unclear and will appear unprincipled without recognition of the 
prior-art status of new scientific discoveries.
42
 For example, on remand 
from the Supreme Court following Bilski, the Federal Circuit in 
Prometheus Laboratories distinguished the “essence” of the human 
medical treatment claims at issue as physically “transformative” from the 
“mere[] data-gathering steps” or “insignificant extra-solution activity” of 
a clinical diagnostic claim that the Federal Circuit had earlier found to be 
ineligible.
43
 But the decision failed to explain why the “‘gist’ or ‘heart’” or 
“point of novelty”
44
 of the claimed invention lay in the physically 
 
 37. Cf. John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. Rev. 1139, 1142 
(1999) (“[O]ur long-held sense of the reach of the patent system . . . .”). 
 38. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231, 3236 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 39. Id. at 3231. 
 40. Id. at 3226; see also id. at 3227 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972)); In re 
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954–55 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 41. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963–64. 
 42. See, e.g., Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Current State of Patent Eligibility of Medical and 
Biotechnology Inventions in the United States, in Intellectual Property and Emerging 
Biotechnologies (Matthew Rimmer & Alison McLennan eds., forthcoming 2011); Joshua D. Sarnoff, 
Patent Eligible Medical and Biotechnology Inventions After Bilski, Prometheus, and Myriad, 19 Tex. 
Intell. Prop. L.J. 393, 395 (2011) [hereinafter Sarnoff, Medical and Biotechnology Inventions]. 
 43. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (distinguishing In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989)), cert. 
granted, 131 S. Ct. 3027 (2011); see also Christopher M. Holman, On Remand, Federal Circuit (Once 
Again) Decides Prometheus v. Mayo in Favor of Patent Eligibility for Methods of Treatment and 
Diagnostic Tests, Holman’s Biotech IP Blog (Dec. 17, 2010), http://holmansbiotechipblog.blogspot.com/ 
2010/12/on-remand-federal-circuit-once-again.html (arguing that the panel decision’s attempt to 
distinguish Grams was “less than entirely convincing”). 
 44. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Point of Novelty 2 (Stanford Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 
1735045) (quoting Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1985)) (citing Oskar 
Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim 1 (Feb. 24, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1769270), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1735045; see also 
Kevin E. Collins, Semiotics 101: Taking the Printed Matter Doctrine Seriously, 85 Ind. L.J. 1379, 1381 
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transformative application and not in the discovered correlation employed 
by it. The decision also held that the treatment claims at issue did “not 
preempt all uses of the natural correlations; they utilize[d] them in a 
series of specific steps,” because other drugs might be found that 
purportedly employed the same correlations.
45
 The decision thus failed to 
explain why these steps were not merely insignificant extra-solution 
activity that similarly prevents specific uses of natural correlations from 
preempting other uses.
46
 It remains to be seen whether the Supreme 
Court will provide any more convincing explanations for its pending 
decision in Prometheus Laboratories or will find any constitutional 
restrictions on creating property from the public domain, particularly in 
light of the pending challenge in Golan v. Holder.
47
 
Part I of this Article briefly describes the two-hundred-year history 
of patentable subject-matter eligibility doctrine in the United States, 
arising from the English experience;
48
 discusses the development of the 
current doctrinal standards for eligibility; and explains the origins of the 
categorical exclusions and their prior-art treatment in religious and 
deontological moral commitments.
49
 Part II discusses why alternative 
approaches to eligibility focusing on claim scope or physicality will 
remain misguided, derivative, and inadequate to assess inventive 
creativity;
50
 describes how prior-art treatment of excluded discoveries 
 
(2010) (noting that the printed matter doctrine applies a point-of-novelty approach). 
 45. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 628 F.3d at 1355. The court, however, failed to recognize that the 
correlations applied to the observed and claimed thiopurine drugs; other drugs generating the same 
metabolites would be the subject of different, unclaimed natural correlations. See Sarnoff, Medical and 
Biotechnology Inventions, supra note 42, at 404. 
 46. Cf. Holman, supra note 43 (suggesting that claim scope was a plausible distinction of Grams, 
but “would be better addressed using the enablement requirement rather than patent eligibility”). 
 47. 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (2011). Various constitutional 
innovation policies and utilitarian and deontological moral concerns may justify different kinds of line 
drawing for subject-matter eligibility. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Ten Law Professors in Support 
of Appellee Director of the United States Patent & Trademark Office at 6–12, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 
943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (No. 2007-1130). See generally Edward C. Walterscheid, The Nature 
of the Intellectual Property Clause: A Study in Historical Perspective (2002). Further, the case 
law history reveals that ideas should be considered abstract when they constitute “functional 
properties on which claimed inventions operate or results to be achieved by employing those 
properties.” Brief of Eleven Law Professors and AARP as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 
23–24, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964) (citing Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 
87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874)). See generally Pamela Samuelson & Jason Schultz, “Clues” for 
Determining Whether Business and Service Innovations Are Unpatentable Abstract Ideas, 15 Lewis & 
Clark L. Rev. 109 (2011). 
 48. A more detailed history is provided in Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patents and Morality: Religion, 
Science, Nature, and the Law (forthcoming). 
 49. See infra Part I; see also 1 William C. Robinson, The Law of Patents for Useful 
Inventions § 25 (1890). 
 50. Cf. Risch, New Uses for Patent Utility, supra note 32, at 13–18 (discussing practical utility as a 
substitute for eligibility criteria—specifically for distinguishing abstract from nonabstract ideas, laws of 
nature from patentable applications, and natural products and their relationship to inherency and 
public benefit) (citing, inter alia, Michael Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, 2010 BYU L. Rev. 1195 
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compares to other jurisdictions’ approaches and better protects against 
claims that would effectively block or dominate subsequent applications 
of excluded subject matter; and explains the proper relationship between 
eligibility and various patentability doctrines.
51
 Part III discusses many 
efficiency and some moral benefits of relying on categorical, threshold 
eligibility determinations so long as science, nature, and ideas are treated 
as prior art. Part III also explains why we should not abandon this long-
standing and highly successful approach to protecting the public 
domain,
52
 sacrifice these utilitarian benefits, or reject the deontological 
moral norms that support keeping the public domain free from private 
patent property rights.
53
 These moral norms include valuing our common 
heritage,
54
 protecting freedom of thought and expressive communication,
55
 
preserving bodily integrity and personality,
56
 and maintaining certain 
activities or things free from the patent system or subject to certain kinds 
 
[hereinafter Risch, Reinventing Usefulness]). 
 51. See infra Part II; cf. Donald S. Chisum, Weeds and Seeds in the Supreme Court’s Business 
Method Patents Decision: New Directions for Regulating Patent Scope, 15 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 11, 
13 (2011) (discussing Bilski and the Court’s distinction of what Chisum calls the “Invention 
Achievement Inquiry” and distinguishing it from the “Protection Scope Inquiry”). 
 52. But cf. Lemley, supra note 44, at 33–34 (suggesting that the Flook approach of dissecting 
novelty and of excluding discoveries from inventive contributions was a new and short-lived 
development, and arguing that it was properly rejected in Diehr for excluding too many useful 
applications from the patent system). 
 53. See infra Part III; see also, e.g., Nuffield Council on Bioethics, The Ethics of Patenting 
DNA 21–23 (2002) (discussing moral concerns with owning genetic materials, including views that they 
are the common heritage of humanity; inalienable, public property; and discoveries rather than 
inventions); cf. Thomas, supra note 37, at 1141 (“[T]he patent eligibility inquiry has been reduced to 
one of mere utility. This trend is a disturbing one. . . .”). But cf. Duffy, supra note 11, at 618 (“[T]he 
patentable subject matter doctrines are based not on a moral or ethical decision about the desirability 
of patents as an end in themselves but on empirical estimation[s] of [utilitarian innovation policy].”). 
See generally The Future of the Public Domain: Identifying the Commons in Information Law 
(Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness 
Versus Welfare (2002); Conference: The Public Domain, 66 L. & Contemp. Probs., Winter/Spring 
2003. 
 54. See, e.g., Jasper A. Bovenberg, Property Rights in Blood, Genes, and Data: Naturally 
Yours? 39–49 (2006); Keith Aoki & Kennedy Luvai, Reclaiming “Common Heritage” Treatment in the 
International Plant Genetic Resources Regime Complex, 2007 Mich. St. L. Rev. 35, 36–41. 
 55. See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 237–38 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010) (applying the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims); 
Brief of the Software Freedom Law Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 11–14, 
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964); Michael Crichton, This Essay Breaks the Law, 
N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 2006, at WK13 (discussing Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 
548 U.S. 124 (2006) (per curiam)). 
 56. See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 206–11; 148 Cong. Rec. S5579 
(daily ed. June 14, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy); Brief for the American Medical 
Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 13, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. 
Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006) (No. 04-607); Legislative Updates, Nat’l Inst. Health, 
Off. Legis. & Pol’y Analysis (Feb. 3, 2011), http://olpa.od.nih.gov/legislation/107/pendinglegislation/ 
7cloning.asp. 
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The need to preserve a robust public domain of science, nature, and 
ideas from encroachment by the patent system
59
 thus explains both the 
need for continuing their prior-art treatment and why we cannot and 
should not “see the wisdom of abandoning line drawing.”
60
 To extend 
Fritz Machlup’s famous statement regarding arguments to abandon the 
patent system, it would be “irresponsible, on the basis of our present 
knowledge, to recommend abolishing” the historic protection for science, 
nature, and ideas, provided by prior-art treatment in eligibility doctrine 
and by the requirement for invention in the application.
61
 The Article 
concludes with a brief exhortation to celebrate rather than to reluctantly 
embrace categorical exclusions of patentable subject-matter, their prior-
art status, and the line drawing that eligibility determinations require, to 
better protect the public domain of science, nature, and ideas while 
simultaneously improving the patent system. 
I.  A Very Brief History of Subject-Matter Exclusions  
and the Requirement for “Invention” 
A. Early Approaches 
In England in 1795, in the famous James Watt steam engine case, 
Boulton v. Bull, Chief Judge Eyre expressed the unanimous view that 
“[u]ndoubtedly there can be no patent for a mere principle.”
62
 In contrast, 
it was acknowledged that patents could issue for the invention of 
“manufactures” under the 1623 English Statute of Monopolies,
63
 which 
“applied not only to things made, but to the practice of making, to 
principles carried into practice in a new manner, to new results of 
principles carried into practice.”
64
 The critical issue for the case, on which 
the judges split, was whether patents could issue for practical methods 
 
 57. See, e.g., Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, §§ 14(a), 33(a), 125 Stat. 284, 
327, 340 (2011). 
 58. See, e.g., Gerard N. Magliocca, Patenting the Curve Ball: Business Methods and Industry 
Norms, 2009 BYU L. Rev. 875, 876–77; Jeffrey A. Smith, It’s Your Move—No It’s Not! The 
Application of Patent Law to Sports Moves, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1051, 1082–83 (1999). 
 59. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010) (“[Prior eligibility frameworks] risk obscuring 
the larger object of securing patents for valuable inventions without transgressing the public domain.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 60. Risch, Forward to the Past, supra note 17, at 365. 
 61. Fritz Machlup, An Economic Review of the Patent System, 85th Cong., Study of the 
Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Committee on the Judiciary 80 
(1958). 
 62. (1795) 126 Eng. Rep. 651, 667 (opinion of Lord Eyre, C.J.) (emphasis added); see id. at 662 
(opinion of Buller, J.) (“[A]n idea or a principle alone would not support the patent.”). 
 63. Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, § 6. 
 64. Boulton, 126 Eng. Rep. at 665. 
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(processes) of applying scientific principles that were disembodied from 
any particular arrangement of machinery through which those principles 
operated, and for which arrangements it was acknowledged that a patent 
could issue; that is, whether patents could issue for pure method claims 
divorced from particular structural combinations or even from specific 
contexts.
65
 Stated differently, ineligible mere principles—which constituted 
either scientific discoveries or abstract ideas—were distinguished from 
principles of invention, and it was unclear at the time whether such 
inventive principles could include pure methods. 
At the end of the eighteenth century, the United States Constitution 
vested in Congress the power to grant exclusive rights to “Inventors” for 
their “Discoveries.”
66
 As discussed in more detail below, discoveries of 
inventors had a particular meaning, distinct from discoveries of science 
and nature and thus from the mere principles discussed in Boulton.
67
 In 
the terminology of the time, scientific and natural discoveries were the 
province of “natural philosophy.”
68
 The exclusion from patent eligibility 
for mere principles was also well recognized in the United States: “[A] 
patent may be for a new and useful art; but it must be practical, it must 
be applicable and refer[a]ble to something which may prove it to be 




As Thomas Jefferson famously explained in 1813, ideas are 
nonrivalrous and thus are not proper subjects of exclusive rights at 
natural law: 
 
 65. Compare Boulton, 126 Eng. Rep. at 667 (Lord Eyre, C.J.) and id. at 659 (Rooke, J.), with id. 
at 482 (Heath, J.) and id. at 662, 664–65 (Buller, J.). 
 66. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 67. See Walterscheid, supra note 47, at 125–33 (citing sources and discussing historic difference 
in meaning between “Science” and “Useful Arts”); cf. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978) (“The 
rule that the discovery of a law of nature cannot be patented rests . . . on the more fundamental 
understanding that they are not the kind of ‘discoveries’ that the statute was enacted to protect.”); 
Amicus Curiae Brief of Center for Advanced Study and Research in Intellectual Property 
(“CASRIP”) of the University of Washington School of Law, and of CASRIP Research Affiliate 
Scholars, In Support of Affirmance of the Judgment in Favor of Respondent at 11 n.9, 25 n.44, Bilski 
v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964) [hereinafter CASRIP Bilski Brief] (arguing that these 
terms express “essentially the same limitation,” discussing limits on the meaning of “useful arts,” and 
noting that “basic principles are neither Arts nor Discoveries of Inventors”); Walterscheid, supra 
note 47, at 348–57 (arguing that “Discoveries [of] Inventors” must be read in conjunction with the 
object of “promotion . . . of useful arts’” and interpreting such terms by reference to developing 
English practice in Boulton and its limits on patents for principles of nature). 
 68. See, e.g., Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language, in Miniature 169 (W.P. & L. 
Blake Pubs., 1st Am. ed. 1804) (“[‘Philosophy’ is] knowledge natural or moral, the hypothesis upon 
which natural effects are explained”); William Shakespeare, Hamlet act 1, v. 166–67, n.167 
(Houghton Mifflin 1974) (defining “philosophy” as “natural philosophy, science” in regard to 
Hamlet’s famous line to Horatio). 
 69. Evans v. Eaton, 8 F. Cas. 846, 852 (C.C.D. Pa. 1816) (No. 4559) (emphasis added). 
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[Ideas are] incapable of confinement or exclusive appropriation. 
Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property. Society may 
give an exclusive right to the profits arising from them, as an 
encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility, but 
this may or may not be done, according to the will and convenience of 
the society, without claim or complaint from anybody.
70
 
Further, only some kinds of ideas could be made, by law, the proper 
subject of exclusive private property: discoveries of inventors that were 
not merely abstract principles, scientific principles, or naturally occurring 
materials, which subsequent cases described as “laws of nature, physical 
phenomena, and abstract ideas.”
71
 
In 1790, pursuant to the patent power vested by the Constitution, 
Congress created a Patent Board and authorized it to grant patents to 
inventors who had “invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture, 
engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein.”
72
 The 
contemporaneous meaning of the term “useful art,” in both the 
Constitution and the statute, is subject to significant dispute,
73
 but to 
some extent the statute must have reflected that the exclusive rights 
contemplated by the Constitution (including copyrights) were intended 
to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”
74
 Significantly, the 
Patent Board adopted various restrictions on what qualified as a 
statutory “invention” or “discovery,” in particular that the application of 
a machine to a new use, changes in materials of construction, changes of 
form, and the use of previously known implements in combination (such 
as using a saw and axe together) were not patentable.
75
 Implicit in this 
approach was the belief that the public’s knowledge of a machine 
entitled it to “any use of which it is susceptible.”
76
 Providing exclusive 
rights for applying existing machines to new uses or to new materials, a 
 
 70. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in Thomas Jefferson, 
The Portable Thomas Jefferson 525, 530 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., Penguin Books 1977) (1975) 
[hereinafter Jefferson Letter] (emphasis added); cf. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 
250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“[T]he noblest of human productions—knowledge, truths 
ascertained, conceptions, and ideas—become, after voluntary communication . . . free as the air to 
common use.”). 
 71. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 
309 (1980)). 
 72. Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110. 
 73. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. Compare, e.g., Noah Webster, American 
Dictionary of the English Language (1st ed. 1828) (distinguishing useful arts from other arts), with 
Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1, 533 (1888) (“[U]seful arts [are] arts which may be used to 
advantage.”). 
 74. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see Walterscheid, supra note 47, at 116–17 (arguing that the 
usual interpretation is that the patent power was restricted to promoting the useful arts, and the 
copyright power to promoting science, given the balanced composition style adopted by the Framers). 
 75. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9, 10 n.3 (1966); Jefferson Letter, supra note 70, at 
531–32. 
 76. Jefferson Letter, supra note 70, at 531. 
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patent would take this right from the public and give it to a monopolist.
77
 
Similarly, mere changes of form or of materials for constructing machines 
would simply apply the same inventive principle already known by the 
public, and thus would deprive the public of opportunities to make and 
use machines already within its grasp, even if they had not yet been 
constructed.
78
 As Thomas Jefferson colorfully explained, “But for this 




In 1793, Congress codified at least one of the Board’s negative rules 
of patentability,
80
 specifying that “simply changing the form or the 
proportions of any machine, or composition of matter, in any degree, 
shall not be deemed a discovery.”
81
 Congress thus excluded from patent 
eligibility as not “inventions” or “discoveries” things that, although 
novel, the Board had treated as not patentable because they were obvious 
due to constructive public possession.
82
 Further, by excluding changes of 
form, proportions, or composition, Congress effectively prompted courts 
to restrict patents to new principles of invention employed by particular 
machines.
83
 For similar machines to be patentable, they would have to 
operate according to different principles.
84
 
Nevertheless, Congress in 1793 also expanded patent-eligible 
subject matter to compositions of matter, adopting what is essentially the 
same terminology as in the modern statute, though the term “art” was 
replaced in 1952 by the term “process”:
85
 “any new and useful art, 
machine, manufacture or composition of matter.”
86
 Although the 




 77. Id. 
 78. See id.; see also Brown v. Piper, 91 U.S. 37, 41 (1875). 
 79. Jefferson Letter, supra note 70, at 531. 
 80. The precise origins of the relevant provision are in doubt. Joseph Barnes proposed the 
language to Congress, see Edward C. Walterscheid, The Hotchkiss Unobviousness Standard: Early 
Judicial Activism in the Patent Law, 13 J. Intell. Prop. L. 103, 109 (2005), but the same language had 
previously been enacted in the French Patent Act of 1791, see John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A 
Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 36 (2007). 
 81. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 318, 321 (emphasis added). 
 82. See Duffy, supra note 11, at 624–25 (noting appropriate treatment at the time as an eligibility 
issue). 
 83. See, e.g., Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 431 (1822); Evans v. Eaton, 8 F. Cas. 846, 
852 (C.C.D. Pa. 1816) (No. 4559), rev’d on other grounds, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454 (1818); see also 
Walterscheid, supra note 80, at 108–15 (discussing doctrinal changes resulting from the amended 
statutory language). 
 84. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Historic and Modern Doctrines of Equivalents and Claiming the 
Future, Part I (1790–1870), 87 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 371, 386–91 (2005) (discussing 
principles of invention and conceptual problems regarding their level of generality under the 1793 Act, 
which required different principles for patent eligibility, and noting changes to claiming practices 
resulting from Evans, prior to their codification in the 1836 Act). 
 85. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 86. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 319. 
 87. See supra notes 67, 73 and accompanying text. 
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at the end of the eighteenth century, pure method patents—methods 
claiming all future applications and not merely those substantially similar 
to the disclosed implementing machinery and their equivalents
88
—were 
ineligible for protection and remained so until the late nineteenth 
century.
89
 Nevertheless, there is a distinction between pure methods not 
limited to specific machines on the one hand, and the scientific principles 
on which they operate on the other. This distinction is critical to 
understand, as it distinguishes between the categorically ineligible 
subject matter and, at least potentially, eligible applications thereof. 
Under the 1836 Act, which preserved the statutory eligibility 
categories of the 1793 Act,
90
 the Supreme Court observed in the seminal 
case of O’Reilly v. Morse that newly discovered scientific principles simply 
were not patent eligible; only particular configurations of machinery 
applying those principles were.
91
 Discussing a then-recent English case,
92
 
the Court noted: 
Neilson claimed no particular mode of constructing the receptacle, or 
of heating it. . . . [T]he court at first doubted, whether it was a patent 
for any thing more than the discovery that hot air would promote the 
ignition of fuel better than cold. And if this had been the construction, 
the court, it appears, would have held his patent to be void; because the 
discovery of a principle in natural philosophy or physical science, is not 
patentable. 
  But after much consideration, it was finally decided that this principle 
must be regarded as well known, and that the plaintiff had invented a 
mechanical mode of applying it to furnaces; and that his invention 
consisted in interposing a heated receptacle, between the blower and 
the furnace, and by this means heating the air after it left the blower, 
and before it was thrown into the fire. . . . 
  Undoubtedly, the principle that hot air will promote the ignition of 
fuel better than cold, was embodied in this machine. But the patent was 
not supported because this principle was embodied in it. . . . 
 . . . If the Court of Exchequer had said that Neilson’s patent was for the 
[scientific] discovery, that hot air would promote ignition better than 
cold, and that he had an exclusive right to use it for that purpose, there 
might, perhaps, have been some reason to rely upon it. But the court 




 88. See Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 268–69 (1853); O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 
How.) 62, 115–16 (1853); see also Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454, 517 (1818); Howe v. Abbott, 
12 F. Cas. 656, 657–58 (C.C.D. Mass. 1842) (No. 6766); Wyeth v. Stone, 30 F. Cas. 723, 727 (C.C.D. 
Mass. 1840) (No. 18,107); Barrett v. Hall, 2 F. Cas. 914, 923 (C.C.D. Mass. 1818) (No. 1047); Lowell v. 
Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568). 
 89. See Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787–88 (1876); Brief of Eleven Law Professors and AARP 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 18–19, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964). 
 90. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119. 
 91. 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 115–16. 
 92. Neilson v. Harford, (1841) 151 Eng. Rep. 1266, 1267–68. 
 93. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 115–16 (emphasis added). 
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Two aspects of this discussion from the Morse decision are critical. 
First, the basis for finding patentability was not the fact that the machine 
embodied (that is, applied in a novel, concrete, and particularized 
manner) a newly discovered scientific principle. Rather, what grounded 
patent eligibility was the inventive (in other words, creative as well as 
novel) application of that principle reflected in the particular mechanical 
mode invented by Neilson or Morse. Stated differently, the principle of 
invention (the specified “means . . . to produce the result or effect”
94
) 
capable of being patented by Neilson or Morse was a principle in 
addition to that of the discovery of the natural properties of combustion 
or electromagnetism; it was a principle regarding the configuration of 
machinery or the arranged steps of a specific process, that employed the 
scientific discovery, and not merely the application of the discovery to a 
new use. 
As stated a year earlier in Le Roy v. Tatham, 
In all such cases, the processes used to extract, modify, and 
concentrate natural agencies, constitute the invention. The 
elements of the power exist; the invention is not in discovering 
them, but in applying them to useful objects. 
. . . . 
In the case of Bean v. Smallwood . . . Mr. Justice Story said, “He 
(the patentee) says that the same apparatus, stated in this last 
claim, has been long in use, and applied, if not to chairs, at least in 
other machines, to purposes of a similar nature. If this be so, then 
the invention is not new, but at most is an old invention . . . applied 
to a new purpose. . . . If it is old and well known, and applied only 
to a new purpose, that does not make it patentable.”
95
 
Second and more importantly, merely applying the new scientific 
discovery to exploit its properties in a noninventive, but novel, manner 
could not have justified a patent. This is because the Court in Morse had 
held that even a newly discovered scientific principle “must be regarded 
as well known.”
96
 As Le Roy had indicated, there would be no eligible 
invention in merely applying the (fictionally) well-known scientific 
principle to a “new purpose.”
97
 Although the 1836 Act had eliminated 
the 1793 Act’s language stating that changes to form or proportions were 
not discoveries,
98
 the courts had continued to require a new “principle of 
invention” to establish patent eligibility.
99
 Invention—both for patent 
 
 94. Id. at 119. 
 95. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175–77 (1852) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Bean v. 
Smallwood, 2 F. Cas. 1142 (C.C.D. Mass. 1843) (No. 1173)). 
 96. 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 116. 
 97. 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 177. 
 98. See Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119; Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 
318, 319. 
 99. See Sarnoff, supra note 84, at 387–89; Edward C. Walterscheid, Novelty and the Hotchkiss 
Standard, 20 Fed. Cir. B.J. 219, 255 (2010). 
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eligibility and for patentability—thus required creativity in the application 
of scientific discoveries; that is, more than merely applying the discoveries 
to a new use, as reflected in the particular machinery or method steps 
described and claimed in the patent.
100
 
B. Developing the Requirement for Invention in the Application 
for New Things and New Uses 
1. Requirements for Invention, Dissimilarity, and Additional 
Creativity in the Means of Application 
Three years before Morse, in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, the Supreme 
Court introduced the requirement that the level of creativity necessary 
for an eligible and patentable “invention” reflect more than the 
“ingenuity or skill . . . possessed by an ordinary mechanic” to achieve a 
new result.
101
 Invention, like the earlier statutory exclusion from eligible 
discoveries, required “ingenuity . . . [beyond] judgment and skill in the 
selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the 
instrument for the purposes intended.”
102
 Hotchkiss thus stands for, 
among other things, the principle that the statutory eligibility categories 
(the one at issue being manufactures), did not include many novel 
creations otherwise falling within the statutory categories of subject 
matter, as they were not considered patentable inventions.
103
 
The Hotchkiss Court, however, did not make clear whether it 
believed this interpreted or created limitation on eligibility was a 
constitutional requirement, a statutory construction based on the 
inherent meaning of the statutory term “invention,” or a judicially 
adopted limitation.
104
 The Court also did not make clear the kind and 
degree of ingenuity required for invention, other than that it was more 
than mechanical skill.
105
 But the Court did clearly indicate that the very 
concept of an eligible and potentially patentable “invention” (which is 
the subject of the patent laws) requires both novelty and sufficient 
creativity to generate new conceptual things; mere novel variations of 
existing things or novel combinations of them that produced better 
 
 100.  See, e.g., Samuelson & Schultz, supra note 47, at 119–20 (citing Giles S. Rich, Principles of 
Patentability, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 393, 393–94 (1960)). 
 101. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 265 (1850). 
 102. Id. at 266. 
 103. Cf. Dunbar v. Myers, 94 U.S. 187, 199 (1876) (“[T]he substitution of equivalents, doing the 
same thing as the original invention by substantially the same means, is not such an invention as will 
sustain a patent. . . .”) (emphasis added) (citing Smith v. Nichols, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 112, 119 (1874)). 
 104. Cf. Walterscheid, supra note 80, 124–26 (2005) (arguing that the Court in Graham v. John 
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966), interpreted the Constitution to impose a requirement of inventive 
creativity beyond novelty, but did not justify the specific requirement of obviousness on this 
requirement). 
 105. See Walterscheid, supra note 99, at 262–63. 
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results were not inventions.
106
 The Court thus suggested in dicta that a 
substituted material that resulted in changing an old manufacture into a 
different thing (“resulted in a new and useful article”) would be “the 
proper subject of a patent.”
107
 
Difficult line-drawing decisions are required to determine when a 
qualitatively or categorically new thing has been created, rather than just 
a novel variation of an existing thing. Similarity and difference are 
notoriously difficult to pin down theoretically, and may follow, rather 
than precede, the policy judgments that specify the relevant 
distinguishing criteria.
108
 Accordingly, theoretically undetermined choices 
must be made to assess the nature and sufficiency of invention (in other 
words, the kind and degree of required creativity) of claimed new things 
derived from pre-existing (particularly naturally occurring) things, or of 
claimed new means for applying preexisting knowledge, particularly 
scientific principles or laws of nature. 
In 1887 in Hartranft v. Wiegmann, the Supreme Court articulated a 
standard, in the context of import duties rather than patent law, for when 
a new “manufacture” had been created from natural materials.
109
 To 
qualify as a manufacture required “a new and different article, having a 
distinctive name, character, or use . . . . The application of labor to an 
article, either by hand or by mechanism, does not make the article 
necessarily a manufactured article . . . .”
110
 The Court in Hartranft thus 
distinguished merely novel creations from manufactures, and thereby 
imposed a requirement for line drawing notwithstanding the human or 
machine labor applied to improve the natural thing.
111
 But 
understandably, given that it was not a patent case, the Court did not 
specify how to distinguish for patent eligibility purposes the similarity or 
difference of newly created things from natural things. 
Since Hartranft, the Court has not been terribly clear in specifying 
how, why, and on what criteria to draw the relevant lines between 
patent-eligible new things or new processes on the one hand, and the 
ineligible products of nature they derive from or the laws of nature or 
abstract ideas they apply on the other.
112
 Nor is the terminology of 
 
 106. See Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 265–66. 
 107. See id. at 265. 
 108. See, e.g., Similarity, in M.I.T. Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences 757 (Robert A. 
Wilson & Frank C. Keil eds., 2001) (similarity judgments are “totally unconstrained” without 
reference to a property “that performs all of the explanatory work”) (citing, inter alia, Nelson 
Goodman, Seven Strictures on Similarity, in Problems and Projects (1972)); cf. Ferdinand de 
Saussure, Course in General Linguistics 115 (Roy Harris trans., Open Court 1986) (1913); William 
James, The Principles of Psychology 459 (Dover Press 1950) (1890). 
 109. 121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. (discussing scouring of wool and ginning of cotton). 
 112. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980) (distinguishing Funk Bros. Seed 
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“discovery” or “invention” particularly helpful, given that the Constitution 
and statute apply conjointly or circularly to both terms.
113
 Rather, the 
Court has continued to focus its distinctions on the belief that a claimed 
application of a newly identified discovery is not a patent-eligible 
invention simply because the discovery is applied to a particular and new 
use.
114
 As stated by Justice Nelson in 1862, in the lower court case of 
Morton v. New York Eye Infirmary, a new and additional principle to 
such mere application of a discovery was required for invention: 
A discovery of a new principle, force, or law operating, or which can be 
made to operate, on matter, will not entitle the discoverer to a patent. 
It is only where the explorer has gone beyond the mere domain of 
discovery, and has laid hold of the new principle, force, or law, and 
connected it with some particular medium or mechanical contrivance by 
which, or through which, it acts on the material world, that he can 
secure the exclusive control of it under the patent laws. He then 
controls his discovery through the means by which he has brought it into 
practical action, or their equivalent, and only through them. It is then an 
invention, although it embraces a discovery. Sever the force or principle 
discovered from the means or mechanism through which he has 
brought it into the domain of invention, and it immediately falls out of 




2. Expanding Eligibility to Pure Methods, Application to Machines 
or Transformations, and Preemption by the Principle of the 
Invention 
In 1877 in Cochrane v. Deener, the Court first indicated—under the 
1870 Act, which did not change the patent eligibility criteria from the 
1836 Act
116
—that pure methods could be considered eligible inventions: 
That a process may be patentable, irrespective of the particular form of 
the instrumentalities used, cannot be disputed. . . . A process is a mode 
of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, 
or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed 
and reduced to a different state or thing. If new and useful, it is just as 
patentable as is a piece of machinery. In the language of the patent law, 
it is an art. . . . The process requires that certain things should be done 
with certain substances, and in a certain order; but the tools to be used 




Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948)). 
 113. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“Inventors [for their] . . . Discoveries”); 35 U.S.C. § 100(a) 
(2006) (defining “invention” as “invention or discovery”). 
 114. See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978) (“[T]he Pythagorean theorem would not 
have been patentable, or partially patentable, because a patent application contained a final step 
indicating that the formula, when solved, could be usefully applied to existing surveying techniques.”). 
 115. 17 F. Cas. 879, 881 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 9865) (emphasis added). 
 116. See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 24, 16 Stat. 198, 201. 
 117. 94 U.S. 780, 787–88 (1876). 
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Thus, under Cochrane, inventive processes could be patent eligible by 
employing new discoveries without limitation to specific machines or, in 
the earlier terminology, to specified means.
118
 
But even under Cochrane, an eligible “invention” not employing a 
particular apparatus still required a physical transformation and 
reduction of matter
119
 “to a different state or thing”
120
—in other words, a 




Though the Morse case and The Telephone Cases do not state the rule, 
in so many words, that patents on processes which do not involve the 
manipulation and transformation of physical materials from one 
physical or chemical state into another, must contain limitations 
confining the monopoly grant to the practice of the method by means 
of particular types of apparatus, we submit that the cases follow such a 




Although the Court in Benson (and later in Parker v. Flook
123
 and Bilski 
v. Kappos
124
) rejected the argument that the machine-or-transformation 
precedents established a limiting rule of patent eligibility, it 
acknowledged that the Court’s precedents on method patents had all 
conformed to that test.
125
 
The “machine-or-transformation” framework therefore is not the 
standard for eligibility, but merely the consequence, based on the facts of 
the cases presented, of the requirement that a patent-eligible invention 
must reflect invention in the application of otherwise ineligible science, 
nature, or ideas. Prior to Cochrane’s expansion to pure methods of the 
Court’s earlier limits on method claims,
126
 eligible inventions necessarily 
had to be limited to specific physical embodiments that accomplished 
specific results, and thus had to be tied to “particular”
127
 machines (or 
articles of manufacture) through which the applications of science, 
nature, or ideas were achieved.
128
 After Cochrane, patentable process 
inventions could be articulated without limitation to such particular 
 
 118. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182–84 (1981). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 788. 
 121. 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
 122. Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 9, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (No. 71-485). 
 123. 437 U.S. 584, 588 n.9 (1978). 
 124. 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226–27 (2010). 
 125. 409 U.S. at 71. 
 126. See Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 268 (1853) (“[A] man cannot have a patent for 
the function or abstract effect of a machine, but only for the machine which produces it.”); id. at 269 
(“He cannot describe a machine which will perform a certain function, and then claim the function 
itself, and all other machines that may be invented to perform the same function.”). 
 127. Benson, 409 U.S. at 70. 
 128. See Sarnoff, supra note 84, at 390–91. 
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physical implementing structures, but still required, for eligibility, 
creativity in the application; that is, they required transformation to a 
“different state or thing.”
129
 
Further, before the modern “information age,” inventive creativity 
required physical implementations for its useful application, and thus 
resulted in physical transformations.
130
 Cochrane therefore required 
physical or chemical transformation just as Hartranft required a different 
thing to be created.
131
 At that time, all of the eligibility precedents could 
readily be fit into the machine-or-transformation framework. But mere 
physical implementation or transformation was not sufficient for 
eligibility, as uncreative applications of new discoveries, uncreative 
applications of existing inventions to new uses, or uncreative modifications 
of preexisting things also would reflect physical implementation or 
transformation, but would not result in new and eligible inventions. 
Thus, the Court in Benson, and again in Bilski, could treat the machine-
or-transformation framework as “the clue” to patent eligibility for 




By authorizing pure method patents in Cochrane,
133
 moreover, the 
Court also expanded the scope of patents to cover unenumerated, and 
likely uncontemplated, means of accomplishing specified results. This 
placed even greater emphasis on the newly strengthened requirement for 
distinct claims
134
 and on the sufficiency of the written description of the 
invention to support claims of greater breadth that would then apply to 
any physical means of implementation that fell within the meaning of the 
claim language.
135
 Following Cochrane, it became even more difficult to 
distinguish, based on claim scope, between an ineligible application of a 
categorically excluded, newly discovered scientific principle or 
phenomenon and an eligible inventive process employing that principle 
or phenomenon and not limited to particular physical means. This is both 
because the scope of patent-eligible inventions expanded—so as to 
potentially cover all practical applications of newly discovered 
phenomena—and because the kind and degree of creativity required for 
an eligible invention may have been reduced. Thus, the distinction of 
 
 129. Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876). 
 130. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010) (comparing the “Information Age” to the 
“Industrial Age”). 
 131. Compare Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 788, with Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887). 
 132. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226–27 (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 70). 
 133. 94 U.S. at 788. 
 134. See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201. 
 135. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Historic and Modern Doctrines of Equivalents and Claiming the 
Future: Part II (1870–1952), 87 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 441, 451–54 (2005) (discussing effects 
of the distinct claiming requirement and its relationship to the expanded scope of permissible claims 
following Cochrane). 
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creative and eligible from mere and ineligible applications may have 
become somewhat more difficult to discern. 
In 1888, in the famous Alexander Graham Bell telephone case 
(Dolbear v. American Bell Telephone Co.), the Supreme Court upheld a 
patent for a very broad process claim: 
  In the present case the claim is not for the use of a current of 
electricity in its natural state as it comes from the battery, but for 
putting a continuous current in a closed circuit into a certain specified 
condition suited to the transmission of vocal and other sounds, and 
using it in that condition for that purpose. . . . Bell was the first to 
discover this fact, and how to put such a current in such a condition, 
and what he claims is its use in that condition for that purpose, just as 
Morse claimed his current in his condition for his purpose. . . . It may 
be that electricity cannot be used at all for the transmission of speech 
except in the way Bell has discovered, and that therefore, practically, 
his patent gives him its exclusive use for that purpose, but that does not 
make his claim one for the use of electricity distinct from the particular 
process with which it is connected in his patent. It will, if true, show 




As the Court later explained in Benson, Bell’s claim “was not one 
for all telephonic use of electricity.”
137
 As the Court had suggested in 
Dolbear, using Benson’s modern terminology, Bell’s claim might 
permissibly “pre-empt” all uses (that is, the full scope of application) of 
the invented process and—if the invented process were the only means of 
accomplishing the desired result—all means of accomplishing the 
particular end that the invented process achieves.
138
 But Bell’s claim did 
not, and could not, preempt all uses of the previously known, or newly 
discovered, natural phenomenon—electronic transmission of signals—
that Bell’s creative, invented process employed. It could, however, 
preempt yet to be discovered means of accomplishing the creative end 
result of placing circuits in the appropriate condition for signal 
transmission.
139
 This was because invention required creativity in the 
application of the natural phenomenon; Bell’s invention was not the 
mere application of newly discovered but inherent properties of 




 136. 126 U.S. 1, 534–35 (1888). 
 137. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (citing Dolbear, 126 U.S. at 535). 
 138. See id. at 72. 
 139. See Dolbear, 126 U.S. at 538–39 (noting that Bell’s claim was for the use of electricity in a 
particular condition to transmit signals, that “long before he did so it was believed by scientists that it 
could be done by means of electricity” but Bell “discovered the way of doing it,” although the patent 
was not confined to the “mere means he improvised to prove the reality of his conception” (emphasis 
added)). 
 140.  See id.; cf. id. at 573 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (“[T]here are two modes (as yet discovered) by 
which these undulations [of electric current] may be thus produced.”). 
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In contrast, and unlike in Dolbear, the Supreme Court in Benson 
failed to appreciate the requirement for additional creativity in the 
application, which distinguished claims to inventions from claims to 
ineligible natural phenomena. The Court thus rejected the implication in 
Dolbear that a patent could issue that preempted all means of 
accomplishing the inventive end to be achieved—at least when the end 
was the only practical application for a new natural or abstract discovery: 
The mathematical formula involved here has no substantial practical 
application except in connection with a digital computer, which means 
that if the judgment below is affirmed, the patent would wholly pre-
empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a 
patent on the algorithm itself.
141
 
Benson’s formulation focuses on the scope of the effects of granting 
the patent rather than on the nature of the invention actually reflected by 
the claim; in other words, on preemption of applications or of sequential 
invention.
142
 But this formulation confuses the distinction between 
ineligible discoveries and patentable inventions, and thus between 
science, nature, and ideas on the one hand and human technology and 
practical applications on the other. The closed circuits at issue in Dolbear 
did not exist in nature; they were synthetic creations of humans and thus 
their principles of operation and the technology they reflected were, at 
least according to the Court, sufficiently creative inventions that could be 
patented without regard to their preemptive scope.
143
 
Six years after Benson, in Parker v. Flook, the Court reiterated its 
earlier understanding that a patentable invention required additional 
creativity in the application of newly discovered phenomena, rather than 
a merely narrow scope of exclusion, which does not chill too much 
sequential innovation: “Even though a phenomenon of nature or 
mathematical formula may be well known, an inventive application of 
the principle may be patented. Conversely, the discovery of such a 
phenomenon cannot support a patent unless there is some other inventive 
concept in its application.”
144
 
Three years later still, in Diamond v. Diehr, the Court reiterated 
that a mathematical formula cannot be patented
145
 and that “this 
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the 
formula to a particular technological environment. . . . Similarly, 
 
 141. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71–72. 
 142. See Chisum, supra note 51, at 28–30 (discussing how Benson improperly focused on the scope 
of exclusion rather than on the nature of the disclosed invention). 
 143. See 126 U.S. at 538–39. 
 144. 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978) (emphasis added); cf. Lemley et al., supra 12, at 1330 (“Overclaiming 
under § 101 . . . is primarily concerned with removing obstructions to follow-on innovation.”). 
 145. This implies that mathematical formulas (and similarly formulaic algorithms) are either 
“abstract ideas” or “natural phenomena.” See Samuelson & Schultz, supra 47, at 112–13 (discussing 
Bilski’s treatment of algorithms as abstract ideas). 
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insignificant postsolution activity will not transform an unpatentable 
principle into a patentable process.”
146
 Although the Court in Diehr did 
not adequately explain why this was the case, it at least acknowledged 
that the mere limitation of the formula to a specific context or the 
addition of insignificant physical implementation steps would not by 




Although the Court in Diehr reiterated Flook’s requirement to treat 
the newly discovered formula as if it were already in the prior art, the 
Court criticized the argument that the claim could not be eligible if every 
element except the formula was already known in the art: 
[A] new combination of steps in a process may be patentable even 
though all the constituents of the combination were well known and in 
common use before the combination was made. The “novelty” of any 
element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no 
relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls 
within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter. . . .  
. . . . 
. . . The fallacy in this argument is that we did not hold in Flook that 
the mathematical algorithm could not be considered at all when 
making the § 101 determination. To accept the analysis proffered by 
the [Government] would, if carried to its extreme, make all inventions 
unpatentable because all inventions can be reduced to underlying 




Although the Court was undoubtedly technically correct that a 
combination of old elements may be patent eligible, its discussion of the 
need to focus on the claim as a whole, rather than on dissecting claim 
elements to determine the point of novelty, was misleading on two levels. 
First, even in Flook, the Court had rejected the idea that claim dissection 
was required, holding that its “approach to respondent’s application is, 
however, not at all inconsistent with the view that a patent claim must be 
considered as a whole” before determining whether the claim “considered 
as a whole” reflected any “other inventive concept in its application” of 
the categorically excluded algorithm.
149
 Second, precluding the novelty of a 
newly discovered but ineligible algorithm from directly supplying the 
eligibility of a claim containing old elements does not necessarily lead to 
finding all implementations (applications) employing the algorithm 
obvious, any more than a novel combination of prior-art elements is 
inherently obvious without considering the creativity reflected by the 
 
 146. 450 U.S. 175, 191–92 (1980) (internal citation omitted) (citing Flook, 437 U.S. at 584). 
 147. See id. 
 148. Id. at 188–89, 189 n.12. 
 149. 437 U.S. at 594. 
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combination.
150
 Rather, it is precisely those creative applications that are 
not implicit in light of underlying scientific principles that constitute an 
“invention” eligible for patenting. 
Diehr, like Benson, thus imposed needless confusion by permitting 
the creativity of the ineligible discovery to contribute directly to the 
eligibility of a claimed application without considering whether there was 
any additional creativity in the application itself. This confusion is 
particularly evident given the Court’s simultaneous acceptance in Diehr 
of the premise that the algorithm itself could not be patented when 
merely limited to particular fields of application (technological contexts) 
or when combined with insignificant (physical) activity.
151
 Such claims 
when viewed “as a whole” constitute the same “type of subject matter,”
152
 
processes, as do creative and inventive applications of new discoveries—
they just lack invention in those applications. Similarly, the Court’s 
reference to the transformation prong of the machine-or-transformation 
framework to suggest when a claim “considered as a whole[] is 
performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect”
153
 
provides no basis to distinguish when sufficient transformations have 
been created, as is required under Cochrane.
154
 Diehr thus offered no 
means to assess whether particular processes applying scientific 
discoveries and abstract ideas were or were not inventions. 
3. Developing the Non-Analogous Uses and Markedly Different 
Characteristics Tests 
Returning to the nineteenth century, in 1892—four years after 
Dolbear—the Court in Ansonia Brass & Copper Co. v. Electric Supply 
Co. noted that “nothing is better settled in this court than that the 
application of an old process to a new and analogous purpose does not 
involve invention, even if the new result had not before been 
contemplated.”
155
 Clearly, the Court could not have understood Dolbear 
to permit eligibility based simply on novelty or physical transformations. 
In contrast, a new use of an existing thing—including a natural product—
or of an existing process could be an eligible invention if that new use 
was not analogous to a known use of the thing or process and thus was a 
sufficiently creative application: 
 
 150. Compare, e.g., United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 45–48, 50–51 (1966), with Anderson’s-
Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 58–62 (1969). 
 151. See 450 U.S. at 191–92. 
 152. Id. at 188–89. 
 153. Id. at 192 (“[P]erforming a function which the patent laws were designed to protect (e.g., 
transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing) . . . .”). 
 154. See Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1877). 
 155. 144 U.S. 11, 18 (1892) (emphasis added). 
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  On the other hand, if an old device or process be put to a new use 
which is not analogous to the old one, and the adaptation of such 
process to the new use is of such a character as to require the exercise 




Although Ansonia Brass did not directly address applications of 
newly discovered natural things or scientific knowledge, this requirement 
for creativity of claimed applications was perhaps best described in that 
context by the Ninth Circuit in Wall v. Leck, decided three years later: 
[E]mployment of [a scientific discovery] in the modes or through the 
instrumentalities by which it is applied in nature is a mere imitation of 
what every man is able to perceive and reproduce as well as [t]he 
[patentee]. All endeavors to confine it to himself are at once futile and 
unjust. . . . The laws . . . do not permit any man to exclusively use the 
conditions which are the gifts of nature, simply because he was the first 
one to discover its value. Not until some new instrument or method is 
contrived for its direction towards ends which it cannot naturally 
accomplish does his creative genius manifest itself.
157
 
The implication of Wall is crystal clear. To be an eligible invention, the 
claimed, novel application of a natural phenomenon or scientific 
principle must exhibit some function different than that which exists in 
nature. It is that different function which supplies the requisite creativity 




In the first half of the twentieth century, in American Fruit Growers, 
Inc. v. Brogdex Co., the Court held—based on Hartranft—that to be 
patent eligible as a “manufacture,” a new and different article created 
from pre-existing nature (or other human-created inventions) had to 
“possess[] a new or distinctive form, quality, or property. . . . There [must 
be a] change in the name, appearance, or general character of the [thing 
from which it was created].”
159
 Echoing Cochrane, the Court also noted 
that there must be a physical “transformation” involved in making “a 
new and different article . . . emerge.”
160
 But as it was already known in 
the art that boracic acid prevented mold (on fruit), the “mere 
substitution of [alkaline borax for boracic acid, even if novel] would not 
involve invention.”
161
 Such a substitution would generate a novel but 
necessarily analogous, and thus ineligible, product, just as the novel but 
analogous use was ineligible in Ansonia Brass.
162
 This was true even 
 
 156. Id. 
 157. 66 F. 552, 558 (9th Cir. 1895) (emphasis added) (citing, inter alia, Robinson, supra 49, § 186). 
 158. Cf. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948). 
 159. 283 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1931); see also id. at 12–13 (citing Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 
(1887)). 
 160. Id. at 13. 
 161. Id. at 14 (citing 1 Albert H. Walker, Walker on Patents § 426 (6th ed. 1929)). 
 162. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co. v. Elec. Supply Co., 144 U.S. 11, 18 (1892). 
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though the novel combination had properties (mold resistance) that were 
not possessed by the natural article (fresh fruit) alone, and even though 
the claimant had discovered a natural property regarding inhibition of 
blue mold spore growth, that is, that borax was “especially potent in its 
retarding and inhibiting action.”
163
 The product remained analogous to 
natural fruit, with the new property merely “protect[ing] . . . against 
deterioration” without any “change in the name, appearance, or general 
character of the fruit.”
164
 The product claim thus was ineligible because 
the natural thing (fruit) was not transformed into an invention; the 
process claims were invalid as not new in light of analogous prior-art 
treatment of fruit with boracic acid.
165
 
In the most recent Supreme Court case on patent-eligible things 
created from products of nature, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Court 
reiterated Hartranft’s requirement for “a product of human ingenuity 
‘having a distinctive name, character [and] use.’”
166
 The Court, moreover, 
distinguished as an eligible invention the claimed synthetic bacterium at 
issue from the claimed novel combination of naturally occurring bacteria 
that it had found to be ineligible in Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo 
Inoculant Co.
167
 In Funk Brothers, the patentee had “used that discovery 
[of the noninhibiting effect of certain species of bacteria] to produce a 
mixed culture capable of inoculating the seeds of leguminous plants,” but 
the novel, human-produced culture was “only some of the handiwork of 
nature,” “[n]o species acquire[d] a different use,” and the combination 
“serve[d] the ends nature originally provided and act[ed] quite 
independently of any effort of the patentee.”
168
 In contrast, the new 
bacterium created by Chakrabarty had “markedly different characteristics 
from any found in nature and . . . the potential for significant utility.”
169
 
The “markedly different characteristics” standard of Chakrabarty is 
essentially the same as the non-analogous use requirement articulated in 
Ansonia Brass. Unless the newly created thing is markedly different, it 
might be novel but not meaningfully different; that is, it may be similar 
and thus analogous. Unless markedly different, the novel product would 
not reflect a sufficiently creative change to an existing thing as to convert 
it into an invention. Further, the fact that the novel bacterium in 
Chakrabarty possessed utility could not have been the feature or 
requirement for eligibility that distinguished Funk Brothers. The Funk 
 
 163. Am. Fruit Growers, 283 U.S. at 8. 
 164. Id. at 11–12. 
 165. See id. at 13–14. 
 166. 447 U.S. 303, 309–10 (1980) (quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887)) 
(alteration in original). 
 167. 333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
 168. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310 (emphasis added) (quoting Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 131). 
 169. Id. 
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Brothers combination, and other discoveries and inventions previously 
found ineligible by the Court (including the treated fruit in American 
Fruit Growers), possessed substantially improved practical utility.
170
 
Although the Court in Funk Brothers did not directly explain why 
the novel combination at issue did not reflect sufficient creativity to 
constitute a patent-eligible human invention, the Court’s treatment of 
the scientific discovery of the noninhibiting effect of naturally occurring 
bacteria provides an answer. As the Court noted, not only were the 
qualities of the bacteria at issue not patentable because patents “cannot 
issue for the discovery of the phenomena of nature,”
171
 but also because 
those qualities “like the heat of the sun, electricity, or the qualities of 
metals, are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men. They are 
manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively 
to none.”
172
 As in Morse, the discovery of the qualities of the bacteria had 
to be treated as if it were already known, even though the applicant 
himself first made the discovery and thus added the knowledge to the 
storehouse for the public to gain access to it.
173
 Once that discovery was 
treated as if in the prior art, no sufficient creativity was required to apply 
it to the particular useful result by merely combining the strains of 
bacteria that were then (fictionally) already known to be noninhibiting. 
Stated differently, the combination was neither a new thing with 
markedly different characteristics nor a non-analogous use of the pre-
existing, and fictionally known, qualities of the bacteria, even if a non-
naturally occurring, novel, and useful combination resulted. The Court 
thus specifically rejected the lower court’s view that making a “new and 
different composition of noninhibitive strains which contributed utility 
and economy to the manufacture and distribution of commercial 
inoculants” was an “invention within the meaning of the patent 
statutes.”
174
 And it said this at a time when the statute did not contain a 
requirement for non-obvious invention, but only the eligibility standard 
and its statutory categories.
175
 
Funk Brothers was decided shortly before the non-obviousness 
requirement of patentability was first codified in the 1952 Act.
176
 As the 
Supreme Court held in Graham v. John Deere Co., Congress clearly saw 
the codification as a major change to the statute and as an opportunity 
both to provide a new linguistic formula for the required creativity for 
 
 170. See Am. Fruit Growers, 283 U.S. at 8 (discussing the significantly improved mold resistance 
resulting from treatment with ordinary borax). 
 171. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130. 
 172. Id. (emphasis added). 
 173. See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 116 (1853). 
 174. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130–31. 
 175. See 35 U.S.C. § 31 (1948). 
 176. See Act of July 19, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 103, 66 Stat. 792, 798 (adopting section 103) 
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006)). 
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patentability—non-obviousness rather than invention—and to avoid 
concerns raised by the language or certain precedents,
177
 while preserving 
the same general level of creativity that had preceded enactment: 
The major distinction is that Congress has emphasized “nonobviousness” 
as the operative test of the section, rather than the less definite 
“invention” language of Hotchkiss that Congress thought had led to “a 
large variety” of expressions in decisions and writings. In the title itself 
the Congress used the phrase “Conditions for patentability; non-obvious 
subject matter” . . . thus focusing upon “nonobviousness” rather than 
“invention.” 
. . . . 
  It is undisputed that this section was, for the first time, a statutory 
expression of an additional requirement for patentability, originally 
expressed in Hotchkiss. It also seems apparent that Congress intended 
by the last sentence of § 103 to abolish the test it believed this Court 
announced in the controversial phrase “flash of creative genius,” used 
in Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp. 
. . . . 
  We believe that this legislative history, as well as other sources, 
shows that the revision was not intended by Congress to change the 
general level of patentable invention.
178
 
Nevertheless, the legislative history provides no suggestion that Congress 
intended to change the then-existing law regarding patent eligibility in 
any way except one.
179
 
In 1943, in In re Thuau, the Federal Circuit’s predecessor court had 
departed from the Supreme Court’s Ansonia Brass precedent and had 
held that all new uses of known things, even non-analogous uses—and 
thus also all new uses of phenomena of nature, which had to be treated 
as if already known—were unpatentable as not a new “art,” under the 
eligibility language of the 1870 Act.
180
 Congress thus substituted the term 
“process” for “art” in the new eligibility section 101,
181
 which it otherwise 
left unchanged from the 1870 Act, and defined “process” in section 
 
 177. See generally Rich, supra note 25. 
 178. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 14–15, 17 (1966) (emphasis added) (citing Cuno Eng’g 
Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941)). 
 179. See H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952) (“[The language of the 1870 Act] has been preserved 
except that the word ‘art’ which appears in the present statute has been changed to the word 
‘process.’ . . . The definition of ‘process’ has been added in section 100 to make it clear that ‘process or 
method’ is meant, and also to clarify the present law as to the patentability of certain types of 
processes or methods as to which some insubstantial doubts have been expressed.”); id. at 17 (“The 
remainder of the definition clarifies the status of processes or methods which involve merely the new 
use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material; they are processes 
or methods under the statute and may be patented provided the conditions for patentability are 
satisfied.”); S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 4–5, 13 (1952); see also Pasquale J. Federico, Commentary on the 
New Patent Act (1954), reprinted in 75 J. Pat & Trademark Off. Soc’y 161, 176–78 (1993). 
 180. 135 F.2d 344, 347 (C.C.P.A. 1943). 
 181. See Act of July 19, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 101, 66 Stat. 792, 797 (codified as amended at 
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)). 
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100(b)
182
 to overturn Thuau and to restore the law of eligibility to its 
prior state.
183
 In doing so, Congress also clarified in the legislative history 
that the term “process” included pure methods, based on the Court’s 
prior determinations that pure method patents were eligible.
184
 
Specifically, new section 100(b) provided that the statutory term 
“process” means “process, art or method, and includes a new use of a 
known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or 
material.”
185
 Although this statutory language is broad, there is no 
suggestion that the phrase “includes a new use” was intended to mean 
“includes every new use,” eliminating the requirement for an “invention” 
to reflect at least some creativity in any novel application. Section 101 
continued to apply to persons who “invent or discover” one of the 
statutory categories, and the change to the definition of “process” would 
then have reflected a much more dramatic and fundamental change to 
the meaning of these terms.
186
 In contrast, the legislative history indicates 
that “invention” was defined to include “invention or discovery” only in 
order to avoid repetition in the statute,
187
 and there is no suggestion 




Contemporaneous commentary also suggests that the statutory 
language in section 100(b) was intended solely to restore the law to what 
the Court had established in Ansonia Brass. As noted by Stefan Riesenfeld, 
[T]he background of the amendment gives reason to assume that a 
newly discovered use for a known substance, machine or process is still 
only patentable if it is not merely analogous or cognate to the uses 
heretofore made. . . . [I]t is fair to state that in essence the new 
statutory definition of “process” restores the broad principles of 
patentability flowing from a careful analysis of the exposition given by 
the Supreme Court in the Ansonia case . . . .
189
 
Similarly, as noted by Pasquale Federico, one of the 1952 Act’s two 
principal drafters, 
  The reference to the new use of a known machine or manufacture in 
the definition merely means that processes may utilize old machines or 
manufactures and the reference to the new use of a known process 





 182. See id. § 100(b), 66 Stat. at 797 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2006)). 
 183. See, e.g., Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The New United States Patent Act in the Light of Comparative 
Law I, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 291, 299–300 (1954). 
 184. See H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952). 
 185. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2006). 
 186. Cf. supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 187. See H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 16 (1952). 
 188. See Riesenfeld, supra note 183, at 299–300. 
 189. See id. 
 190. Federico, supra note 179, at 178. 
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Had Congress intended to authorize as an eligible “invention or 
discovery”
191
 even noncreative new uses of existing things, including newly 
discovered natural phenomena, it almost certainly would have said so in 
the legislative history. This is particularly true given the dramatic change 
to the law that such an alteration would have reflected, and given that 
the legislative history indicated that the only “major changes or 
innovations” to the statute consisted of “incorporating a requirement for 
invention in § 103”—following Hotchkiss and its numerous progeny—
and revising “the judicial doctrine of contributory infringement in 
§ 271.”
192
 Nor would changing only the definition of eligible processes to 
include new uses have altered the existing judicial standards for eligibility 
of the other categories of subject matter (things), which were required, 




It is, of course, conceivable to impute to the 1952 Congress the 
intent to make such dramatic changes to patent eligibility, if one ignores 
the legislative intent, adopts a purely textualist
194
 reading of the statutory 
categories of section 101, and leaves all questions of sufficient creativity 
to the newly created non-obviousness provision of section 103.
195
 But no 
Supreme Court decision since the 1952 Act has so construed the statute 
in regard to applications of categorically excluded science, nature, and 
ideas, and this interpretation is highly implausible for the reasons just 
stated. In particular, the Court has continued in Benson, Flook, 
Chakrabarty, Diehr, and Bilski to parse the creativity of novel 
applications of science, nature, and ideas to determine if they are eligible 
subject matter, notwithstanding their status as processes, machines, 
manufactures, or compositions of matter, rather than deferring all such 
questions to the obviousness inquiry under section 103.
196
 
Although this approach best corresponds to legislative intent, it is 
also efficient and normatively justified given the prior-art treatment of 
categorically excluded science, nature, and ideas, as discussed below. 
Further, it mirrors international understandings of the patent system. 
 
 191. See Act of July 19, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 100(a), 66 Stat. 792, 797 (codified as amended 
at 35 U.S.C. § 100(a) (2006)). 
 192. H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 5 (1952); see Karl B. Lutz, The New 1952 Patent Statute, 35 J. Pat. 
Off. Soc’y 155, 162 (1953). 
 193. Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 13 (1931); Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 
U.S. 609, 615 (1887). 
 194. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621, 640–56 (1990); 
John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 Va. L. Rev. 419, 420–21 (2005). 
 195. Cf. Rich, supra note 25, at 29 (“[F]or the century following Hotchkiss v. Greenwood we had 
what was called the ‘requirement for invention,’ which, I emphasize, we have not had for the past 
twenty years. Instead we have § 103.”). 
 196. But cf. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 220 (1976) (avoiding eligibility arguments, but 
reiterating the need to evaluate the differences between the prior art and the claim). 
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The World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property does not define invention or distinguish 
inventions from scientific, natural, and abstract discoveries, but requires 
that patents “shall be available for any inventions . . . in all fields of 
technology, provided they are new, involve an inventive step, and are 
capable of industrial application.”
197
 This reflects that whatever creativity 
is required for an eligible invention is not necessarily sufficient for an 
inventive step, but that there cannot be an inventive step without an 
eligible invention. Similarly, the European approach, under the 
European Patent Convention (“EPC”), which explicitly excludes things 
like ideas from being considered “inventions,”
198
 requires for 
patentability that an eligible “invention” reflect an “inventive step.”
199
 As 
discussed below, however, the EPC applies the contributions of 
categorically ineligible subject matter inconsistently for eligibility and for 
patentability evaluations, allowing the creativity of newly discovered, 
categorically excluded subject matter to contribute to eligibility but not 
to an inventive step.
200
 Under the prior-art approach, the creativity of the 
categorically excluded subject matter does not contribute to eligibility or 
to patentability. 
C. The Religious Origins of the Prohibition on Patenting 
Discoveries and the Moral Obligation to Treat New Discoveries 
as Prior Art 
So where does this requirement to treat science, nature, and ideas as 
prior art come from? The following discussion supplies a partial 
historical account, starting with the post-Enlightenment, English 
Protestant religious understandings brought to the United States.
201
 The 
discussion is of American cultural and legal thought, although other 




 197. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 27(1), Dec. 15, 
1993, 33 I.L.M. 81. 
 198. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, art. 52(2), Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 271, as 
revised Nov. 26, 2000.  
 199. Id. at arts. 52(1) & 56. 
 200. See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
 201. See generally Sarnoff, supra note 48. 
 202. Cf., e.g., Tokkyoh [Japanese Patent Act], Law No. 121 of 1959, Art. 2(1) (“[‘Invention’ is] the 
highly advanced creation of technical ideas utilizing the laws of nature.” (emphasis added)); Revision of 
the European Patent Convention (EPC 2000) Synoptic Presentation EPC 1973/2000—Part I: The 
Articles, 2007 O.J. EPO Spec. Ed. 4, at 48 (“[The 2000 revisions to the European Patent Convention, 
Art. 52(1)] plainly expresses that patent protection is reserved for creations in the technical 
field . . . [that] must therefore have a ‘technical character’ or, to be more precise, involve a ‘technical 
teaching’.”); Dr. Kelvin W. Willoughby, How Much Does Technology Really Matter in Patent Law? A 
Comparative Analysis of Doctrines of Appropriate Patentable Subject Matter in American and 
European Patent Law, 64 Fed. Cir. B.J. 63, 75–124 (2008). 
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John Locke began his analysis of property from the basic moral 
equality of humans as God’s creatures of equal station, having “an equal 
Right to the use of the inferior Creatures, for the comfortable 
preservation of their Beings.”
203
 From this equal state of control over a 
natural God-given commons, Locke derived a moral principle of equal 
human regard from the typicality of the “God-given moral status” of 
each individual.
204
 This equal regard forces each individual to take every 
other individual’s duty of self-preservation as having universality, 
anticipating the Kantian categorical imperative.
205
 
Locke famously developed the concept of human labor granting the 
right to exclusive private appropriation of (private property in) nature, 
which otherwise was given by God to all humanity as commons property 
for all to share: “[T]hough the things of Nature are given in common, yet 
Man (by being Master of himself, and Proprietor of his own Person, and 
the actions or Labour of it) had still in himself the great Foundation of 
Property . . . .”
206
 The reason that nature was understood as commons 
property is that nature as such was not a human but a divine creation and 
not subject initially to human control (dominion).
207
 Locke based his 
natural law conception of property on a Biblical moral imperative for 
productivity, which cultivation of land achieved: “Have a lot of children! 
Fill the earth with people and bring it under . . . control.”
208
 And as with 
one’s body, nature was God-given, which imposed inherent stewardship 
obligations on the uses humans could make of nature.
209
 
As Justin Hughes has noted, Locke’s labor theory debatably may 
depend on an assumption of “abundance” in nature, so that everyone 
who labors can obtain “enough and as good” from the commons as 
anyone else can obtain.
210
 This condition has been called Locke’s proviso, 
 
 203. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government § 87, at 243 (Peter Laslett ed., New American 
Library 1965) (1689). 
 204. Jeremy Waldron, God, Locke, and Equality: Christian Foundations of John Locke’s 
Political Thought 155–57 (2002) (quoting 1 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding 94 (Alexander Campbell Fraser ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press 1894) (1690)) (citing 
1 Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity § 8, at 80 (Arthur Stephen ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1989) (1593)). 
 205. Immanuel Kant, Ethical Philosophy: The Complete Texts of Grounding for the 
Metaphysics of Morals, and Metaphysical Principles of Virtue, Part II of the Metaphysics of 
Morals ¶ 421, at 30 (James W. Ellington trans., Hackett Publ. Co. 2d ed. 1994) (1785). 
 206. Locke, supra note 203, § 44, at 340–41. 
 207. See id. § 26, at 328. 
 208. Genesis 1:28. 
 209. See Sibyl Schwarzenbach, Locke’s Two Conceptions of Property, 14 Soc. Theory & Prac. 141, 
145–47 (1988); see also Roberta R. Kwall, Book Review, The Author as Steward “For Limited Times,” 
88 B.U. L. Rev. 685, 691–92, 700–08 (2008) (reviewing Lior Zemer, The Idea of Authorship in 
Copyright (2007)). 
 210. Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 Geo. L.J. 287, 297 (1988) (citing, 
inter alia, Locke, supra note 203, § 27; Thomas Mautner, Locke on Original Appropriation, 19 Am. 
Phil. Q. 259, 260 (1982)). 
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or his sufficiency proviso.
211
 Further, after identifying the basis for private 
property in labor where sufficiency (equivalency) can be maintained, 
Locke immediately found limits on creating such property by 




The same Law of Nature, that does by this means give us Property, 
does also bound that Property too. . . . As much as anyone can make 
use of to any advantage of life before it spoils; so much may he by his 
labour fix a Property in. Whatever is beyond this, is more than his 
share, and belongs to others.
213
 
For property in both acquired natural materials and enclosed land, to 
exceed the boundaries of what could be productively used was “to 
transform properly human liberty into license and thereby violate the 
highest potential of the species.”
214
 
Unlike physical property, intangible ideas are not part of a 
commons in the sense of an area capable of being depleted, but rather 
are part of a metaphorical area. That area is both nonrivalrous and 
expands, rather than is depleted, with use, and thus arguably always 
meets Locke’s sufficiency proviso.
215
 For Locke, a person who “leaves as 
much as another can make use of, does as good as take nothing at all,”
216
 
and “unilateral acquisition . . . in circumstances of plenty . . . . pays 
tribute to the underlying principle of equality by indicating that if the 
interests of others are not prejudiced by my acquisition then there can be 
no objection to it.”
217
 But for the sufficiency proviso to be met with 
regard to property in ideas, the ideas subjected to appropriation must be 
fungible
218
 and the property rights must not preclude similar ideas from 
being used by others. 
In general, the broader the idea is, the less likely it will be that any 
similar idea will exist for others to use, either as an idea that already lies 
within the intellectual commons or as a potential idea that might be 
added to the commons by an initial inventor, and appropriator, of it.
219
 
For nonfungible ideas that are understood to preexist their discovery by 
 
 211. See, e.g., Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 175 (1974); Waldron, supra note 204, 
at 172. 
 212.  See, e.g., Waldron, supra note 204, at 170; Hughes, supra note 210, at 325 (using the term 
“non-waste condition”). 
 213. Locke, supra note 203, § 31, at 332. 
 214. Kristie M. McClure, Judging Rights: Lockean Politics and the Limits of Consent 94 
(1996). 
 215. See Hughes, supra note 210, at 315. 
 216. Locke, supra note 203, § 33, at 333. 
 217. Waldron, supra note 204, at 172 (citing Locke, supra note 203, §§ 33–34, at 333). 
 218. See Hughes, supra note 210, at 336 (citing Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 
34 Stan. L. Rev. 957, 989–91 (1982)) (discussing fungibility in regard to Hegelian personality theory of 
intellectual property). 
 219. Cf. id. at 323–25, 327. 
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humans, the commons is necessarily diminished and others are 
necessarily prejudiced by its exclusive acquisition and withdrawal from 
use by granting exclusive rights. For preexisting science and nature and 
for newly discovered and highly abstract ideas, “it is hard to imagine 
anything ‘as good’ that could be left for others to discover. . . . [Some] 
ideas are so fundamental . . . that allowing ownership in them would 
violate the equality of creative liberty which the proviso also 
embodies.”
220
 As recognized in Funk Brothers, these ideas are the 
“storehouse of knowledge of all men . . . . free to all men and reserved 
exclusively to none.”
221
 Or, in common patent parlance, some ideas simply 
cannot be designed around, given the world we live in and the need to 
make use of them or given their broad and basic nature. Thus, Locke’s 
provisos implied at natural law a prohibition on the patenting of science, 
nature, and abstract ideas—at least those that are believed to preexist 
their discovery by humans or are otherwise nonfungible.  
Assuming that certain categories of ideas were sufficiently similar to 
be considered fungible, creating private property in them once they were 
“appropriated” would not violate the sufficiency proviso. But the legal 
inability of others to use or to build off of such ideas might still violate 
Locke’s waste proviso. For Locke, the waste that may result from 
creating property in ideas would not have been a loss so much of value to 
the creator or to others
222
 as of productivity that might be made by 
preventing others from using the ideas. 
To avoid waste in produced physical goods, Locke depended on 
trade in the money economy and the willingness of the property owner to 
sell the unused surplus goods to others without involving “tremendous 
reallocations of wealth toward the property holders of these ideas.”
223
 
Otherwise, possession of such property would “[deny] everyone . . . the 
use of them by someone who has no use for them himself, or does not 
propose to put them to human use.”
224
  
But providing private ownership of fungible ideas fails to account 
adequately for the waste that results from their nonrivalrous and 
nondepletable character. Market exchanges for all possible occurrences 
or uses of science, nature, and broad, abstract ideas would seem 
impossible, given their ability to be brought into existence and use 
virtually anywhere. 
Because sharing knowledge of God’s natural laws—science, nature, 
and ideas—could not reduce the discoverer’s ability to employ them in 
 
 220. Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the 
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 Yale L.J. 1533, 1581 (1993). 
 221. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
 222. See Hughes, supra note 210, at 327–28. 
 223. See id. at 320. 
 224. Waldron, supra note 204, at 171. 
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nature, the discoverer therefore had a moral, God-given duty to share 
knowledge of nature
225
 that could increase cultivation by others, and not 
merely to trade any surplus he or she might generate. This moral duty to 
share information with others also followed from Locke’s effort: 
[With Richard Hooker’s help to make a case] for the Golden Rule: 
“Love thy neighbor as thyself” or “Do unto others as you would have 
them do unto you.” . . . Richard Hooker’s argument cited by Locke in 
section 5 of the Second Treatise is supposed . . . . [t]o show that once we 
acknowledge that no human has a superior status, we have no choice 
but to treat the needs and desires of others as on a par with our own.
226
 
Given equal concern for others, humans would similarly want other 
discoverers to freely and widely share their information regarding nature, 
so as to better assure self-preservation in accordance with God’s purposes. 
The Golden Rule thus dictated creating the public domain of science, 
nature, and ideas. 
By the late eighteenth century, notwithstanding changing 
theological conceptions and the growth of atheism, nature was 
understood as “one grand, interrelated design, comprehensible by 
rational investigation,”
227
 the understanding of which would benefit all 
humans. During this period, invention was still understood in the 
classical sense of uncovering something in nature that had been present 
all along, through the mechanism of divine providence in permitting 
human access to such knowledge.
228
 The divine creations of science, 
nature, and broad abstract ideas that were revealed to humanity through 
the efforts of scientists and philosophers, “those favoured mortals . . . 
who share that ray of divinity which we call genius,” were thus intended 
to be freely available.
229
 And “[i]f the inventor was no more than God’s 
instrument in bringing His gifts to the community, then he could at most 
claim user’s rights over them.”
230
 
Moreover, the divine origins of discoveries of nature, and their 
initial status as commons property, imposed moral duties to freely share 
knowledge of science, nature, and ideas. Scientists were “entrusted by 
Providence with the delegated power of imparting to their fellow 
creatures that instruction which heaven meant for universal benefit; they 
must not be niggards to the world, or hoard up for themselves the 
 
 225. Cf. Robinson, supra note 49, § 25, at 39. 
 226. Waldron, supra note 204, at 155 (citing 1 Hooker, supra note 204, § 8, at 80). 
 227. Christine MacLeod, Inventing the Industrial Revolution: The English Patent System 
1660–1800, at 203 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2002) (1988) (citing Robert Boyle, The Works of the 
Honourable Robert Boyle (Thomas Birch, ed. 1744)). 
 228. See, e.g., id. at 198. 
 229. 17 The Parliamentary History of England col. 999 (T.C. Hansard 1813) (1774) (Lord 
Camden). 
 230. MacLeod, supra note 227, at 198. 
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common stock.”
231
 As Edward Walterscheid noted, the medieval belief 
that “genius was a gift of God . . . largely precluded an earlier 
development of the concept of intellectual property. For how could one 
properly seek to obtain commercial value from that which was perceived 
to have been granted by the grace of God?”
232
 Although times were 
changing, they had not done so for patents on science, nature, and 
ideas—and still have not done so. 
The religion-inspired prohibition on owning science, nature, and 
abstract ideas was well understood by the end of the eighteenth century, 
as reflected in the fact that all of the judges in Boulton v. Bull 
acknowledged that “mere principles” were not capable of being 
patented.
233
 Thus, Joseph Bramah argued against Watt’s patent by stating 
that the “works of men begin” at the point “where the independent 
works of God end, who by his own secret principles and 
methods . . . established the elements and their properties, and stocked 




Further, it was commonly recognized at that time that property 
rights in functional ideas (inventions), unlike in literary authorial ideas 
(published words),
235
 did not arise under natural law.
236
 Such invention 
rights could exist only by the positive act of a government—through the 
grant of patents—and were not otherwise recognized at common law.
237
 
Utilitarian philosophers in the late eighteenth century therefore felt the 
need to articulate a call for government intervention to create rights to 
inventions as incentives for their production and distribution.
238
 But these 
positive law rights did not and, given contemporaneous deontological 
moral beliefs, could not attach to the science, nature, and ideas 
themselves, only to the creative human applications that the inventor had 
actually discovered. And, as aptly put by the late nineteenth century 
patent law scholar William Robinson, the religious prohibition on 
 
 231. 17 The Parliamentary History of England, supra note 229, at col. 999; see 1 William 
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 1765–6, at 8, 14.  
39–40 (Univ. of Chicago 1979) (1766) (discussing moral duties to disseminate knowledge). 
 232. Walterscheid, supra note 47, at 39. 
 233. See (1795) 126 Eng. Rep. 651, 667 (Lord Eyre, C.J.). 
 234. MacLeod, supra note 227, at 220 (quoting Joseph Bramah, A Letter to the Rt. Hon. Sir 
James Eyre, Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas (1797)). 
 235. In 1774, in Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L.), the English Parliament 
reversed its earlier decision in Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B.), that copyrights arose 
at natural law. See generally Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (1968). 
 236. See, e.g., Walterscheid, supra note 47, at 203–04 (citing The Federalist No. 43 (James 
Madison)); cf. Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. at 218 (Willes, J.); id. at 222 (Aston, J.); id. at 230–
35 (Yates, J.). 
 237. See Millar, 98 Eng. Rep. at 230–31 (Yates J.). 
 238. See Harold G. Fox, Monopolies and Patents: A Study of the History and Future of the 
Patent Monopoly 204 (1947). 
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creating such property and the obligation to share new discoveries 
corresponded with the utilitarian goal of promoting progress, whether 
understood as creative development or as dissemination: “To benefit by 
the discoveries of his fellow-men is thus not only a natural right, it is also 
the natural duty which every man owes to himself and to society; and the 
mutual, universal progress thence resulting is the fulfillment of the 
earthly destiny of the human race.”
239
 As described above, these 
commitments have been preserved throughout the more than two 
hundred years of American patent law doctrine; we continue to 




In summary, the prior-art treatment of newly discovered science, 
nature, and ideas reflects long-standing and deeply held deontological 
and utilitarian moral commitments to protecting the public domain and 
to assuring its free availability and dissemination for the development 
and use by the public of their many applications. The “invention in the 
application” test and the “markedly different” and “non-analogous use” 
standards for assessing eligibility protect the public domain by permitting 
only different and sufficiently creative inventive concepts to be eligible, 
thus preventing the piecemeal claiming of uncreative applications within 
the public’s grasp, which would, in effect, claim the discoveries 
themselves. Although the courts may not have specified (or consistently 
imposed) the criteria for determining the degree and kind of creativity 
that reflect markedly different characteristics or non-analogous uses, 
they have yet to abandon this framework, even when unconsciously 
applying or affirmatively resisting it.
241
 
II.  Explaining the Relationship of the Exclusions for Science, 
Nature, and Ideas to Patent Eligibility and  
Patentable Invention 
History reveals that the three categorical exclusions from patent-
eligible subject matter—for “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and 
abstract ideas”
242
—and the need for more than “field of use” limits or 
“token postsolution components,”
243
 define the boundaries of potentially 
eligible “inventions” subject to the patentability requirements of the rest 
of the statute. Additional policy guidance is needed to relate those other 
 
 239. Robinson, supra note 49, § 25, at 39. See generally Malla Pollack, What Is Congress Supposed 
to Promote?: Defining “Progress” in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or 
Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 Neb. L. Rev. 754 (2001). 
 240. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010). 
 241. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191–92 (1981); Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. 
Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868–69 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 242. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)). 
 243. Id. at 3231. 
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requirements to the invention requirement, and to inform the judgments 
of similarity and difference required for establishing eligibility, as 
markedly different characteristics or non-analogous uses (or new 
inventive principles) of any newly discovered science, nature, and 
ideas.
244
 This guidance cannot be supplied by the competing approaches 
to eligibility that have been articulated by the courts and partially 
supported by some scholars. 
A. Mistaken Modern Approaches to Eligibility 
Concern over “preempting” applications by patenting claims to 
applications of science, nature, and ideas
245
 is both misleading and 
unhelpful. Preemption is a misleading concept because the scope of a 
claimed invention simply is not the relevant question for eligibility. As 
Dolbear held, but Benson has called into question, so long as the claimed 
application of a natural phenomenon is sufficiently creative, it may 
preempt all physical means of creating or performing it.
246
 This is true 
even if the claimed manner of application is the only way to achieve the 
desired result and thereby covers all practical uses of a new scientific 
discovery. Of course, it would be correspondingly unlikely that—once a 
new scientific discovery became known and was treated as prior art—the 
only practical use would be a sufficiently creative application. 
Preemption is unhelpful because it changes the focus from the 
nature of the invention for which patent protection is sought, and from 
the requisite judgments of human creativity or similarity, onto the 
consequence of granting protection; that is, it puts the cart of the 
conclusion before the horse of one of its premises.
247
 Moreover, once 
pure method patents are acknowledged as patent eligible, claim scope 
determinations cannot supply the required distinctions between 
ineligible natural discoveries and noncreative applications of them on the 
one hand, and broad but inventive applications of them on the other.
248
 
Similarly, using the machine-or-transformation framework to assess 
whether a claimed process invention employs a “particular machine” or 
achieves a physical transformation of “a particular article into a different 
state or thing”
249
 is misleading and unhelpful. The machine-or-
transformation framework misdirects attention to insufficient conditions 
 
 244. See supra Part I.A–I.B. 
 245. See supra notes 31, 45, 141–43 and accompanying text. 
 246. See supra notes 125, 136–41 and accompanying text. 
 247. Cf. Chisum, supra note 51, at 29 (arguing that in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972), 
the Supreme Court extended the categorical exclusions from the “Invention Achievement Inquiry” 
“through the ‘preemption’ concept to the Protection Scope Inquiry, as to which the intuitive appeal is 
not so strong”). 
 248. See supra notes 116–32 and accompanying text. 
 249. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010). 
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for eligibility.
250
 It fails to supply distinguishing criteria for the types and 
uses of machines that can be creatively employed and thus distinguished 
from mere (but physical) applications, or analogous uses, of newly 
discovered science, nature, and ideas. The transformation framework 
similarly fails to distinguish the kinds and degrees of physical 
transformation that are sufficiently creative, as the different things may 
not reflect markedly different characteristics or the different methods 
may reflect only analogous uses. The machine-or-transformation 
framework (but not the Supreme Court’s resistance to making it an 
exclusive test
251
) also fails to recognize that specific machines or physical 
transformations were required for Industrial Age creative applications. 
The framework is the consequence of the legal standard applied to the 
facts of that era rather than the imposition of a necessary condition. 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held, without adequately 
explaining why, that the framework is overly prescriptive and that claims 
not meeting the framework may nevertheless be eligible.
252
 In contrast, 
although it has not explicitly stated that the framework is overly 
inclusive, in that claims meeting the framework may nevertheless be 
ineligible,
253
 the Court has in recent cases found method claims that 




The machine-or-transformation framework thus is not helpful in 
preventing improper allowance of narrow but insufficiently creative 
claimed applications of science, nature, and ideas, although it may help 
to preclude the eligibility of overly broad and abstract claims.
255
 It may 
also be insufficiently stringent if additional constitutional constraints 
exist, based on defining the “useful Arts” (in contrast to liberal or 





 250. See supra notes 40–41, 126–32 and accompanying text. 
 251. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226. 
 252. See id. at 3226–27 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972); Parker v. Flook, 437 
U.S. 584, 588 n.9 (1978)). 
 253. See supra notes 159–69 and accompanying text; cf. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 959–60 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (en banc) (discussing and disavowing the “useful, concrete, and tangible result” test of In re 
Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc), and of State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 254. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231; Flook, 437 U.S. at 586 (noting the claim at issue for catalytic 
conversion of hydrocarbons was useful in “a broad range of potential uses” in the petrochemical and 
oil refining industries). 
 255. See, e.g., In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963–65 (finding that a change in legal rights did not involve 
the required machine implementation or an eligible transformation, although physical activity was 
required to implement the claims). 
 256. See CASRIP Bilski Brief, supra note 67, at 18–19, 25 n.44 (suggesting that tests are needed based 
on both protecting the public domain of science, nature, and ideas and on limiting patents to useful arts). 
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Concern over reading the claim as a whole
257
 is also misleading and 
unhelpful. The “claim as a whole” concern poses a straw man, because 
dissection into claim elements was never a requirement for evaluating 
eligibility.
258
 Rather, assessment of the inventive contribution in applying 
the scientific discovery, or the “other inventive concept,”
259
 has always 
been required for eligibility, just as the Supreme Court in Graham v. 
John Deere Co. recognized the need to first determine the difference 
between the claimed invention and the prior art before assessing whether 
a claimed invention is obvious.
260
 Moreover, although reading the claim 
as a whole is a predicate for evaluating the inventive contribution and for 
determining into which of the statutory categories a claimed invention 
falls, it does not reach the question of whether the inventive contribution 
is sufficient for eligibility or whether the claimed “invention” is excluded. 
This is true even when the claim as a whole falls within the language of 
one of the statutory categories, whereas the categorically ineligible 
discovery it applies may or may not fall within one of the statutory 
categories, as with products of nature
261




Finally, it is important to understand that the exclusions from 
patent-eligible subject matter are not merely long-standing judicial 
“exceptions” from the broad statutory eligibility categories, as recently 
suggested by the Supreme Court in Bilski.
263
 Rather, they define the very 
heart of the American patent system—specifying when an eligible 
“invention” has been created within the statutory classes of things and 
processes enumerated in section 101.
264
 They reflect the absence of 
fulfillment of the critical statutory requirement of section 101 that a 
person “invents or discovers” one of the specified classes of subject 
matter, and are not exceptions to those classes of subject matter. An 
“exceptions” approach would suggest, under the relevant canon of 
statutory construction, that the exclusions from patent eligibility should 




 257. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981). 
 258. See supra notes 146–50 and accompanying text. 
 259. Flook, 437 U.S. at 594. 
 260. See 383 U.S. 1, 13–18 (1966). 
 261. Categorically excluded products of nature are normally “compositions of matter.” 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101 (2006). 
 262. Cf. Lemley et al., supra note 12, at 1328 (“[B]ecause patent claims almost never fall outside of 
the four fundamental categories of § 101, when they do it is noteworthy.”). 
 263. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225–26 (2010); Chisum, supra note 51, at 32 (supporting 
Bilski’s language because the “very nature of an ‘exception’ suggests that it should be applied 
restrictively”). 
 264. See generally Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (1967) (discussing the 
importance of gaps in statutory coverage to the statutory scheme and policies). 
 265. See, e.g., Comm’r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989) (“[Where] a general statement of policy is 
qualified by an exception, we usually read the exception narrowly in order to preserve the primary 
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articulated in Chakrabarty, “[i]n choosing such expansive terms . . . 
modified by the comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly contemplated 
that the patent laws would be given wide scope.”
266
 Congress took this 
permissive approach to patent eligibility to ensure that “ingenuity should 
receive a liberal encouragement.”
267
 Similarly, in Diehr, the Court noted 
that it had “more than once cautioned that ‘courts should not read into 




As discussed previously, however, the exclusions from eligibility for 
science, nature, and ideas—and for noninventive applications of them—
not only reflect the requirement of “invention,” they also are integral to 
the purposes of the Patent Act and to the constitutional grant of 
authority to grant exclusive rights for the discoveries of inventors because 
they protect the public domain of science, nature, and ideas.
269
 These 
“exceptions” reflect countervailing public rights of access that also 
should be given “a large and liberal interpretation in order to ensure that 
users’ rights are not unduly constrained.”
270
 These categorical exclusions 
from eligibility and the requirement for additional inventive creativity in 
their application should therefore be warmly embraced, rather than 
grudgingly applied. 
B. Protecting the Public Domain of Science, Nature, and Ideas 
from Encroachment 
Prior-art treatment of new scientific, natural, and abstract 
discoveries makes a huge difference. It does so by precluding patents not 
only on the new discovery itself, but also by rendering novel but 
analogous (in other words, uncreative) applications of those discoveries 
ineligible for treatment as inventions.
271
 Similarly, the new discovery 
 
operation of the provision.”); Spokane & Inland Empire R.R. Co. v. United States, 241 U.S. 344, 350 
(1916) (“[E]xceptions from a general policy which a law embodies should be strictly construed.”). Of 
course, “two inconsistent canons can usually be found for any specific question of statutory 
construction.” Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 
50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 807 (1983). 
 266. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980). 
 267. Id. (quoting 5 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 76 (H.A. Washington ed. 1871)). 
 268. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 269. See supra notes 47, 104, 201–31 and accompanying text. 
 270. CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339 (Can.) at 36, available 
at http://scc.lexum.org/en/2004/2004scc13/2004scc13.pdf (discussing fair dealing for the purpose of 
research under section 29 of the Canadian Copyright Act). Similarly, the experimental use 
“exception” in patent law should not be considered an “exemption” from infringement subject to 
narrow construction but rather a limit to the scope of the infringement right in the first instance. See 
Henrik Holzapfel & Joshua D. Sarnoff, A Cross-Atlantic Dialog on Experimental Use and Research 
Tools, 48 IDEA 123, 136 (2008). 
 271. See supra notes 155–75 and accompanying text. 
Sarnoff_24 (F. Valdez) (Do Not Delete)  12/5/2011 11:32 PM 
December 2011]             PATENT-ELIGIBLE INVENTIONS AFTER BILSKI 95 
reveals that preexisting applications are not novel, as they are understood 
to be inherently anticipated, although newly discovered science, nature, 
and ideas are treated as prior art without regard to public benefit or to 




Treating new discoveries as known prior art and requiring 
additional inventive creativity as the basis for a patent prevents the 
advancement of knowledge inherent in the discovery itself from 
supplying the required original creativity; this result may be a 
constitutional requirement.
273
 Claims merely applying the discovery to a 
new but analogous context would impermissibly exclude others from use 
of the knowledge in that context, adding nothing further to the public’s 
store of knowledge while “lay[ing] a heavy tax”
274
 on the public for uses 
that should be free for all. For this reason, even Diehr acknowledged that 
the ineligibility of new discoveries “cannot be circumvented by 
attempting to limit [their] use . . . to a particular technological 
environment” and that “insignificant postsolution activity will not 




Australian decisional law, by contrast, explicitly refuses to treat a 
new discovery as publicly known prior art when considering the 
creativity of claimed inventive applications, although the discovery itself 
(“as such” in European terms
276
) remains categorically ineligible:
277
 
[An applicant’s] claim for a patent is not validly answered by saying 
that, although there was ingenuity in his discovery . . . no ingenuity was 
involved in showing how the discovery, once made, might be applied. 




 272. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (g) (2006); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jewel Incandescent Lamp Co., 326 U.S. 
242, 247 (1945); Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 711–12 (1880). To the extent that recent analysis of 
the inherency doctrine suggests that prior public benefit (rather than mere existence of the attribute 
later discovered) is the key to inherent novelty, the prior-art treatment of scientific and natural 
discoveries may be understood as extending the relevant recipients of those prior benefits to nature 
itself. Compare Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 371, 374, 379–81 
(2005), with Todd R. Miller, Patented Compounds Inherently Coproduced as Trace Impurities: Issues 
of Inherent Anticipation and Literal Infringement, 32 AIPLA Q.J. 425, 452–53 (2004). 
 273. See supra note 104 and accompanying text; see also Oskar Liivak, The Forgotten Originality 
Requirement: A Constitutional Hurdle for Gene Patents, 87 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 261, 273–
77 (2005). 
 274. Atl. Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1882). 
 275. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191–92 (1981). 
 276. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, supra note 198, at art. 52(3); see id. art. 
52(2)(a) (“The following shall not be regarded as inventions . . . : discoveries, scientific theories and 
mathematical methods . . . .”). 
 277. See Nat’l Research Dev. Corp. v. Comm’r of Patents, (1959) 102 CLR 252, 278 (Austl.) 
(agreeing with an earlier precedent that products of nature themselves are not patentable, regardless 
of the fact that “the assistance of man may be invoked for their planting and cultivation”). 
 278. Id. at 252. 
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In further contrast, a hybrid approach has been adopted under the 
EPC. A “contribution” approach, similar to that of the United States, 
was initially adopted under the EPC but was later abandoned.
279
 
However, the contributed knowledge of the discovery remains excluded 
from consideration, if not necessarily treated as prior art, when 
evaluating the “technical contribution” of the applicant for determining 
the existence of an “inventive step” (that is, obviousness).
280
 But as the 
EPC’s Board recognized, many have strongly criticized the choice to 
permit categorically excluded discoveries to contribute to eligibility, 
given that they do not contribute to patentability.
281
 
As articulated in Neilson, Morse, Flook, and now Bilski, new 
discoveries of science, nature, and ideas must be treated as if they were 
already known, prior art; that is, in the public domain.
282
 The question is 
why we maintain this legal fiction, unlike our colleagues around the 
world. Although Funk Brothers explains that such discoveries “are part 
of the storehouse of knowledge of all men . . . free to all men and 
reserved exclusively to none,”
283
 no one knew what was in the storehouse 
before the discovery was made. Thus, some reason other than a simple 
prohibition on owning the knowledge itself must supply the basis for 
treating such discoveries as known prior art. 
Significantly, the reason for prior-art treatment is that patent law 
does not exist to reward, and should not reward, scientific, natural, or 
abstract discoveries, no matter how much money, effort, and creativity 
went into making them or how much sacrifice went into disclosing 
them.
284
 As one commenter noted in 1932, “[A] scientific discoverer is 
 
 279. See Opinion of the Enlarged Board of Appeal, Case G 003/08, ¶ 10.4 (European Patent Office 
May 12, 2010), available at http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/ 
DC6171F182D8B65AC125772100426656/$File/G3_08_Opinion_12_05_2010_en.pdf. 
 280. Id. ¶ 10.5. Under the EPC “contribution” approach, categorically excluded subject matter 
could not contribute the creativity or novelty to claimed applications for eligibility purposes. Id. 
¶¶ 10.4, 10.5, 10.6. The EPC now permits eligibility for claims that employ a “technical means” or that 
are a “technical product,” even if all novelty and creativity lies in the excluded discovery. Id. ¶¶ 10.6, 
10.7. But it requires that any “technical effect” for an inventive step be reflected in a “technical 
character” found in “all the features together” (and thus in the novel and creative application). Id. 
¶¶ 10.7.1, 12.2.1. Where the only novel feature is nontechnical (in other words, in the categorically 
excluded subject matter), the claim will not be patentable. See id. ¶¶ 10.3, 10.4, 10.5, 10.13.1, 12.2.2, 
13.5.1. 
 281. See id. ¶ 10.13 (“While the Enlarged Board of Appeal is aware that this rejection for lack of 
an inventive step rather than exclusion under Article 52(2) EPC is in some way distasteful to many 
people, it is the approach which has been consistently developed . . . .”). 
 282. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 592 (1978); 
O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 115–16 (1853); Neilson v. Harford, (1841) 151 Eng. Rep. 
1266, 1267–68.  
 283. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
 284. Cf. Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, supra note 50, at 1222–23 (discussing the patent system’s 
“normative bias against basic science” and the ability to modify that bias to “aid commercial 
development and manufacturing with very specific uses that more immediately benefit the public”). 
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not a creator, since he merely lifts the veil and discloses a principle or law 
of nature which has always existed . . . . [A]ll the proponents [of rights in 
scientific discoveries] recognize that the scientific discoverer should not 
have any monopoly of his discovery.”
285
 Even in France—where, at one 
point in the eighteenth century, the French had developed beliefs in the 
natural law rights of inventors
286
—concerted efforts made in the mid-
twentieth century to protect scientific discoveries directly through 
patents or through droits d’auteurs ultimately failed.
287
 Nor does patent 
law exist to reward such discoveries and recoup such investments through 
eligible disclosed inventions that apply the discoveries.
288
 As noted above, 
prior-art treatment protects the discovery from being rewarded and 
constrained by piecemeal patent claims to uncreative applications.
289
 
Rather, patent law exists to reward the creativity only of eligible 
principles of invention themselves, and the investments of money, effort, 
and disclosure made in the creative applications alone. As Flook states, 
patent-eligible inventions must reflect some “other inventive concept” 
than mere application of the new discovery.
290
 It is the other inventive 
concept, and only that concept, that is to be rewarded by a patent, and 
the breadth of patent protection consequently should be coextensive 
 
 285. Holmes, supra note 23, at 1432; see also In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en 
banc) (Rader, J., dissenting) (“Natural laws and phenomena can never qualify for patent protection 
because they cannot be invented at all. After all, God . . . provided these laws and phenomena as 
humanity’s common heritage. Furthermore, abstract ideas can never qualify for patent protection 
because the Act intends, as section 101 explains, to provide ‘useful’ technology. An abstract idea must 
be applied to (transformed into) a practical use before it qualifies for protection.”). 
 286. See C.H. Greenstreet, History of Patent Systems, in Mainly on Patents: The Use of 
Industrial Property and Its Literature 13 (Felix Liebesny ed., 1972) (“[I]t would be a violation of 
the rights of man in their very essence if an industrial invention were not the property of its creator.” 
(translating the 1790 French patent law) (emphasis added)); MacLeod, supra note 227, at 199 (“The 
National Assembly, in 1790, declared that ‘it would be a violation of the Rights of Man . . . not to 
regard an industrial discovery as the property of its author.’” (quoting Frank D. Prager, A History of 
Intellectual Property from 1545 to 1787, 26 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 711, 756 (1944))); cf. Thomas M. 
Meshbesher, The Role of History in Comparative Patent Law, 78 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 594, 
607 (1996) (“[T]he French Revolution engendered a desire to base French patent law upon a natural 
law, rights-of-man concept . . . but this idea acquired no supporters outside of France, and even the 
French backed away from the idea four years later.”). 
 287. See, e.g., Hamson, supra note 23, at 20–29. 
 288. Federal Circuit Judge Newman has come close to articulating this competing vision in the 
context of the written-description requirement. See Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 
1336, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Newman, J., additional views) (“[T]he threshold in all cases 
requires a transition from theory to practice, from basic science to its application, from research plan 
to demonstrated utility. . . . Basic scientific principles are not the subject matter of patents, while their 
application is the focus of this law of commercial incentive. The role of the patent system is to 
encourage and enable the practical applications of scientific advances, through investment and 
commerce. . . . The practical utility on which commercial value is based is the realm of the patent 
grant. . . .”). 
 289. See supra notes 23–24, 241 and accompanying text. 
 290. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978). 
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therewith, as Dolbear confirms
291
 and as Benson less coherently sought to 
establish.
292
 By remaining free from private patent property rights, the 
discovery avoids acting as a pioneering “blocking patent”
293
 that 
dominates both the applicant’s and the public’s creative applications. The 
categorical exclusions prevent claims to the discoveries themselves, 
which would provide exclusivity over all “mak[ing]” of things employing 
or “uses” applying the discoveries.
294
 But a claim for a noncreative 
application of a discovery would effectively stake out the same territory, 
just on a more limited scale. The creativity of making the discovery itself 
would then impose patent costs on all claimed uses of the uncreative, but 
more limited, application. In contrast, treating the discovery as if already 
known avoids indirectly imposing patent-system costs on using the 
discovered knowledge, both for ineligible uncreative and patentable 
creative applications. 
Direct patent-system incentives are thus prohibited for making and 
disclosing new scientific, natural, and abstract discoveries. Nevertheless, 
in some cases patent-system incentives for making and disclosing eligible 
creative applications will prove sufficient for also making and disclosing 
the ineligible discoveries.
295
 But even when they do not, the consequence 
is not necessarily the underproduction or underdisclosure of scientific, 
natural, and abstract discoveries, which is and should remain a serious 
concern given that these discoveries are non-excludable public goods.
296
 
Rather, the consequences will depend on the adequacy of non-patent 




 291. See, e.g., Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1, 534–35 (1888). Thus, although the “abstract 
idea must be applied to (transformed into) a practical use,” it is the inventive concept in the 
“transformation” and not the transformed idea itself that is protected. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1013 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting). 
 292. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972) (“[I]n practical effect [it] would be a patent 
on the algorithm itself. It may be that the patent laws should be extended to cover these programs, a 
policy matter to which we are not competent to speak.”). 
 293. Ariad Pharms., 598 F.3d at 1365 (Rader, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (citing 
Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. A-Roo Co., 222 F.3d 1372, 1379 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2000)); see also Robert P. 
Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 839, 
909–11 (1990). 
 294. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006); see also Holzapfel & Sarnoff, supra note 270, at 173 (discussing 
“absolute” protection beyond conceived or disclosed embodiments or uses). 
 295. Cf. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1031, 
1032 (2005) (“[T]he effort to permit inventors to capture the full social value of their invention—and 
the rhetoric of free riding in intellectual property more generally—are fundamentally misguided. In no 
other area of the economy do we permit the full internalization of social benefits.”). 
 296. See generally Richard Cornes & Todd Sandler, The Theory of Externalities, Public 
Goods, and Club Goods 39–290 (2d ed. 1996); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Knowledge as a Public Good, in 
Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century (I. Kaul et al. eds., 1999). 
 297. To some extent, these concerns reflect differences of faith in market and nonmarket 
approaches to innovation. Cf. Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework for 
Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights, 70 Ohio St. L.J. 1361, 1396–98 (2009) (citing, inter alia, Henry 
E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 Yale L.J. 
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These are not necessarily inadequate even though discoverers will not 
obtain directly, through patent property rights, any social benefits of the 
discoveries themselves.
298
 And even if underproduction or underdisclosure 
were to result, contrary to historic beliefs in the confluence of utilitarian 
and deontological grounds for limiting the patent system,
299
 the religious 




In sum, without prior-art treatment or by otherwise permitting the 
piecemeal claiming of noncreative applications of ineligible discoveries, 
the discoverer effectively would be rewarded for the discovery itself. By 
claiming either uncreative pure methods or many less broad but equally 
uncreative specific applications, the applicant would approximate as a 
matter of legal claim-drafting skill an ineligible claim to the discovery 
itself.
301
 Determining ineligible subject matter based on preemptive scope 
rather than on sufficient creativity therefore reflects, and has properly 
been criticized for duplicating, concerns similar to section 112, paragraph 1 
commensurability evaluations,
302
 in which the scope of the claim for 
exclusion is measured against the scope of the inventive principle 
described and enabled in the specification.
303
 But such duplication does 
not exist for eligibility approaches focused on the required degree of 
 
1742, 1748 (2007); Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 Va. L. Rev. 465, 466–71 
(2004)) (discussing administrative costs and uniformity versus tailoring of intellectual property rights 
through public or private ordering). 
 298. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & Econ. 293, 295 
(1970) (discussing property rights and public goods production); Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. 
Lemley, Spillovers, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 257, 272–73 (2007) (same); cf. Samuelson & Schultz, supra 
note 47, at 117–20 (discussing as a criterion to determine abstractness the adequacy of market 
incentives for creation of many business and service processes, the lack of significant R&D 
investments, and diffuse and collaborative production). 
 299. See supra notes 238–39239 and accompanying text. 
 300. See supra notes 200–41 and accompanying text. See generally Shobita Parthasarathy, Breaking 
the Expertise Barrier: Understanding Activist Strategies in Science and Technology Policy Domains, 
37 Sci. & Pub. Pol’y 355 (2010). 
 301. The one potential limit to this is through the rare application of the reverse doctrine of 
equivalents, where the claimed application is seen as so different that it should not be viewed as 
applying the same inventive concept. See, e.g., Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 
537, 557–67, 573 (1898); Merges & Nelson, supra note 293, at 860–68. 
 302. See, e.g., Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) 
(Newman, J., additional views) (“[T]he patentee is obliged to describe and to enable subject matter 
commensurate with the scope of the exclusionary right.”). 
 303. See, e.g., Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(“[T]he Supreme Court [in Bilski] advised that section 101 eligibility should not become a substitute 
for a patentability analysis related to prior art, adequate disclosure, or the other conditions and 
requirements of Title 35.”); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 996 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Newman, J., 
dissenting) (“If a claim is unduly broad, or if it fails to include sufficient specificity, the appropriate 
ground of rejection is Section 112, for claims must ‘particularly point out and distinctly claim[]’ the 
invention. . . . The filing of a broader claim than is supported in the specification does not convert the 
invention into an abstraction and evict the application from eligibility for examination.” (internal 
citations omitted)); see also supra note 51. 
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creativity (although, as discussed below, duplication may exist with 
regard to obviousness analysis). 
While concerns over claim scope and preemption are significant and 
warrant continued scrutiny, they address principally the proportionality 
of both sides of the patent bargain equation (the “quid pro quo”),
304
 
rather than specifying the value and kind of disclosure qualifying as an 
eligible invention in the first instance (the first side of the equation). 
Unless such proportionality analyses are based ultimately on non-scope 
policy factors—for example, deciding that exclusive rights incentives 
simply are not needed for particular kinds of inventions, such as those 
outside of the useful arts—they cannot support meaningful line drawing 
for eligibility. 
As recognized by the Supreme Court in both Diehr and Flook, 
adding noninventive limitations to claims that restrict scope can avoid 
preempting all applications; disclosing the full scope of what is claimed 
will avoid disproportionality under section 112, but it cannot supply 
eligibility to otherwise ineligible discoveries.
305
 Insignificant additional 
structures, trivial physical transformations, field-of-use restrictions, or 
other noninventive claim limitations may reflect legal skill, but they do 
not impart patent eligibility.
306
 As Justice Breyer recognized in the 
Laboratory Corporation case, artful drafting of such additional limitations 
to the use of natural discoveries may add “nothing . . . of significance.”
307
 
Of course, where the claim is disproportionate to the inventive 
contribution, it may fail both for lack of invention and on the overall 
proportionality balance. Given that new discoveries must be treated as 
prior art, it is no surprise that the preemption approach finds to be 
ineligible claims that effectively exclude all uses of the new discoveries. It 
 
 304. Ariad Pharms., 598 F.3d at 1353–54 (“[Section 112, first paragraph] ‘ensure[s] that the scope 
of the right to exclude, as set forth in the claims, does not overreach the scope of the inventor’s 
contribution to the field of art as described in the patent specification.’. . . It is part of the quid pro quo 
of the patent grant. . . .” (quoting Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 920 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (citing Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2002)))). 
 305. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 n.14 (1981) (“The claims [in Flook], however, did not 
cover every conceivable application of the formula. We rejected in Flook the argument that because 
all possible uses of the mathematical formula were not pre-empted, the claim should be eligible for 
patent protection.”); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 n.11 (1978) (“[I]t is not entirely clear why a 
process claim is any more or less patentable because the specific end use contemplated is the only one 
for which the algorithm has any practical application.”). 
 306. See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92; Flook, 437 U.S. at 590; Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 
70, 72 (1972). 
 307. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 138 (2006) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting from dismissal of certiorari) (noting the restrictions on the claim’s scope and physical 
transformations in performing the process); see Benson, 409 U.S. at 72 (referring to such artful claim 
drafting as “direct attempts” to claim computer programs). 
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is the more limited, uncreative applications that pose the greatest 
problems regarding eligibility theories.
308
 
Similarly, the machine-or-transformation framework provides no 
“clue” at all for making eligibility determinations,
309
 as it lacks any theory 
of the function that “the patent laws were [and were not] designed to 
protect.”
310
 The machine-or-transformation framework is thus incapable 
of principled application, as well as underinclusive and overinclusive of 
the requisite inventive creativity.
311
 In contrast, analogical reasoning from 
past precedents, from which the machine-or-transformation framework 
was derived,
312
 can help to suggest the kinds and degrees of required 
creativity for eligibility. But analogic reasoning is helpful only when the 
analogies are apt, which requires judgments of similarity of context that 
may predetermine the outcomes. And in contexts thought to be non-
analogous, or markedly different, decisionmaking must be guided by 
direct application of the relevant criteria. 
The criteria for sufficient creativity must therefore be specified in 
order to assess whether new types of claimed subject matter are eligible, 
so that the patent system does not deprive the public of its rights to the 
public domain of science, nature, and ideas; that is, unless and until 
Congress deprives the public of such rights and the power to do so is not 
found to be prohibited to it by the Constitution.
313
 In contrast, further 
legislative (and possibly judicial) eligibility restrictions, unless made 




C. The Actual Relationship Between Patent Eligibility and 
Obviousness (and Other Patentability Doctrines) 
Once one recognizes that both patent eligibility under section 101 
and patentability under section 103 require inventive creativity, and that 
even newly discovered science, nature, and ideas must be treated as prior 
art, the relationship between patent eligibility and patentable non-
 
 308. But see supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 309. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010) (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 71). 
 310. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192. 
 311. See CASRIP Bilski Brief, supra note 67, at 21–29; supra notes 249–54 and accompanying text; 
cf. Samuelson & Schultz, supra note 47, at 112–19 (discussing various “clues” to eligibility, based on a 
range of different considerations designed to distinguish abstract ideas from eligible inventions, such 
as level of abstraction, preemption, mental processes, wide-ranging impact, and the Constitution’s 
“emphasis on promoting progress”). 
 312. See supra notes 131–35 and accompanying text. 
 313. Cf. Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (2011).  
 314. See generally Stop the Beach Renourishment Inc. v. Fla. Dept. of Envt’l Protection, 130 S. Ct. 
2592 (2010); Davida H. Isaacs, Not All Property Is Created Equal: Why Courts Resist Applying the 
Takings Clause to Patents, and Why They Are Right to Do So, 15 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1 (2007); Adam 
Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection of Patents Under the 
Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 689 (2007). 
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obviousness becomes apparent. If an application of newly discovered 
science, nature, and ideas is not an “invention,” it also cannot be a “non-
obvious” invention.
315
 In contrast, it is possible for novel applications of 
science, nature, and ideas to qualify as sufficiently creative inventions for 
eligibility. Such inventions in theory might not qualify as non-obvious, 
patentable inventions, if lacking the requisite kind or degree of creativity 
to warrant granting exclusive rights. The Supreme Court in Graham, 
however, suggested that Congress intended no change to the level of 
inventive creativity required for patents when it created the non-
obviousness standard of section 103 for application to prior art as defined 
by section 102.
316
 Thus, any claim to categorically excluded subject matter 
or any claim that lacks invention in applying such subject matter should 
also necessarily be obvious, that is, so long as the categorically excluded 
subject matter is treated as prior art for both eligibility and patentability. 
Court statements and legal arguments that Congress intended section 
101 to preserve broad eligibility and that section 101 should be construed 
so as to effectuate that purpose
317
 thus miss the mark. There is simply no 
point in preserving breadth of coverage under section 101 for what must 
necessarily be unpatentable and obvious because it lacks any invention. 
This is true even if the claims recite machines, manufactures, 
compositions of matter, or processes. 
The categorically ineligible subject matter thus makes no 
contribution to the eligibility of the invention,
318
 and also should not 
contribute to patentability when assessing obviousness.
319
 Allowing 
contributions to be considered for patentability but not for eligibility 
(because section 102 does not define new but ineligible discoveries as 
prior art) can only lead to patent-system errors. Such errors can arise by 
granting patents on claims that, if the contributions do not matter, should 
be considered both ineligible and unpatentable. Or they can arise by 
 
 315. Cf. Chisum, supra note 51, at 22–23 (noting that the Supreme Court in Bilski could have 
relied on obviousness to reject the claims, as it did in Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976), and as it 
could do for many “business methods and biomedical discoveries,” including claims resulting from 
“the application of known techniques to isolate valuable biological subject matter”). Chisum, however, 
did not discuss the prior-art treatment of the discovery, which may be what makes the application or 
isolated material obvious. 
 316. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103(a) (2006); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966); see 
also supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
 317. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010); Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. 
Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 867–68 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Brief for Petitioners at 18–20, Bilski v. Kappos, 
130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964). 
 318. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591–92 (1978) (“The process itself, not merely the 
mathematical algorithm, must be new and useful. Indeed, the novelty of the mathematical algorithm is 
not a determining factor at all.” (citing Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 
94 (1939))); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 
333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)). 
 319. Cf. supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
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excluding claims that, if the contributions do matter, should be 
considered potentially eligible and patentable. Such errors are even more 
likely when different levels of creativity are required for eligibility and 
patentability, and it is hard to imagine why patentability could or should 
require less creativity than is required for eligibility. 
Given the inevitable unpatentability of claims lacking an eligible 
invention, it also becomes evident that it is the prior-art treatment of 
categorically excluded subject matter that really troubles those who 
believe in an expansive patent system. Such believers would be no 
happier if clearer legal rules of unpatentability for obviousness were 
developed based on the prior-art status of such discoveries.
320
 But it is for 
patent eligibility that the Supreme Court has encouraged the lower 
courts to develop such rules.
321
 The Federal Circuit appears reluctant to 
do so on its own,
322
 and we will see if they are willing to acquiesce in any 
adjudicatory rules that the PTO may develop in the Board of Patent 
Appeals and Interferences, so long as the PTO continues to lack 
substantive rulemaking powers.
323
 And unless they abandon the 
preemption or machine-or-transformation approaches, the courts and the 
PTO will continue to confront the prior-art status issue when addressing 
the obviousness of claims that are found to be eligible. 
The prior-art treatment of categorically excluded subject matter also 
explains the relationship between section 101 and section 102, and 
between section 101 and the first and second paragraphs of section 112.
324
 
In contrast, prior-art treatment does not resolve the question of how 
much and what kind of additional “utility,” to the marked differences or 
non-analogous uses required for an eligible invention, may also be 
required for patentability under section 101.
325
 Given that the 
categorically excluded subject matter is treated as prior art, any claim to 
such subject matter itself cannot be novel. Section 102, like section 101, 
refers to “inventions,” and the lack of novelty for excluded subject 
 
 320. Cf. Joshua D. Sarnoff, Bilcare, KSR, Presumptions of Validity, Preliminary Relief, and 
Obviousness in Patent Law, 25 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 995, 1027–30, 1041–43 (2008) (citing KSR 
Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 505 U.S. 398, 416–17 (2007)) (discussing how the Supreme Court may have 
created a conclusive legal rule or a presumption of obviousness for combinations of prior-art elements 
shown to lack a new function); Keith Perine, Patent Overhaul Provisions May Complicate Tax 
Preparation, CQ Today (Feb. 2, 2011) (discussing opposition to legislation proposing to treat tax 
liability methods as prior art for the purposes of obviousness analysis, which purportedly would 
adversely affect innovation, investment, and competitiveness in the financial software products 
industry (quoting Rey Ramsey, President of the TechNet coalition)). 
 321. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229. 
 322. See Research Corp. Techs., 627 F.3d at 868. 
 323. See, e.g., Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1352–53 (Fed. Cir. 2009), vacated, 328 Fed. App’x 658 
(Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 324. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 112 ¶¶ 1, 2 (2006). 
 325. Cf. Risch, New Uses for Patent Utility, supra note 32, at 5–10 (discussing operable, practical, 
and commercial usefulness, and timing and measurement issues in assessing utility). 
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matter exists without regard to the specific listed events that would 
otherwise be required to place such knowledge in the public domain (for 
example, “known or used by others”).
326
 Once the applicant discloses the 
knowledge of the discovery in the patent application, the public 
effectively receives the benefit of that knowledge retroactively, at least 
for science and nature, which are inherent to the world; the applicant 
therefore cannot be considered the first inventor of such knowledge.
327
 
Claims reflecting applications of the newly discovered science, nature, or 
ideas in previously existing products or processes that had unknowingly 
incorporated them, moreover, would lack any novel invention based on 
traditional inherency doctrine. 
The mismatch between an insufficient inventive disclosure and the 
exclusive breadth of a claimed application is traditionally policed by 
section 112, paragraph 1, through the written-description and enablement 
requirements.
328
 As noted by the Supreme Court in Morse, because 
claims to categorically excluded subject matter are not the claimants’ 
inventions, they also cannot legally be “described” as “invented” by the 
applicant.
329
 Thus, such claims may violate both sections 101 and section 
112.
330
 But the same is true for noninventive applications of science, 
nature, and ideas, which also are not “inventions.” Conversely, so long as 
the description and claim match the applicant’s actual invention, which 
permissibly may include only sufficiently creative applications of newly 
discovered science, nature, and ideas, neither section 101 nor section 112 
 
 326. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
 327. See supra note 272 and accompanying text; cf. Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville 
Co., 270 U.S. 390, 399–401 (1926) (discussing the defense in the predecessor act that the applicant was 
not the “first inventor,” and noting that a description filed in an earlier patent application by another 
can “show[] that [the current applicant] was not the first inventor,” which rule was subsequently 
codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)). 
 328. See, e.g., Vincent Chiapetta, Patentability of Computer Software Instruction as an “Article of 
Manufacture:” Software as Such as the Right Stuff, 17 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 89, 164 
(1998) (discussing “two different kinds of abstraction,” failure to put to any practical use, and 
vagueness, with the latter relating to how (rather than in what context) to implement the claim and 
triggering section 112 paragraph 1 enablement concerns); Chisum, supra note 51, at 21 (“The purpose 
of the [written-description requirement] . . . is very similar to that given by the Supreme Court in 
defense of the Section 101 ‘abstract-ideas’ exception. . . . [precluding] patents for (1) ‘basic 
research, including research into scientific principles and mechanisms of action,’ as opposed to ‘the 
practical implications of . . . such research,’ (2) ‘for academic theories, no matter how groundbreaking 
or necessary to the later patentable inventions of others’ and (3) ‘research plans,’ which ‘impose costs 
on downstream research.’” (quoting Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1353 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010) (en banc))); Chisum, supra note 51, at 19 (noting that enablement is the “primary claim-
scope regulator”); supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 329. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1853) (“In fine he claims an exclusive right to 
use a manner and process which he has not described and indeed had not invented, and therefore could 
not describe when he obtained his patent.” (emphasis added)). 
 330. See, e.g., Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 277 U.S. 245, 257 (1928) (“That the 
patentee may not by claiming a patent on the result or function of a machine extend his patent to 
devices or mechanisms not described in the patent is well understood.”). 
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written-description requirements should pose any constraint on patent 
eligibility or on patentability.
331
 Nevertheless, such descriptions might not 
enable others to make and use the full scope of the claimed eligible 
invention, under whatever is the proper standard of permissible 
“experimentation” required to do so.
332
 
Indefiniteness under section 112, paragraph 2, is sometimes raised as 
a concern, particularly in regard to the eligibility of claims applying 
abstract ideas.
333
 As with written description, so long as the claims are 
limited to creative applications that are clearly claimed, neither 
definiteness nor eligibility should be an issue. In contrast, even creative 
applications may not be clearly claimed, and indefiniteness concerns may 
remain. Definiteness thus is not a substitute for eligibility analysis. 
Further, claims to categorically excluded subject matter and to 
noncreative applications thereof are not claims for “inventions,” and thus 
the claims may not objectively match what the applicant “regards as his 
invention,” even when their subject matter is susceptible to being 
“particularly point[ed] out and distinctly claim[ed].”
334
 
In sum, section 101 establishes the subject matter of claims that 
qualify as patent-eligible “inventions,” rather than as categorically 
ineligible discoveries and noncreative applications of them. It is these, 
and only these, inventions that are supposed to be measured against the 
prior art (which includes newly discovered but ineligible discoveries) for 
 
 331. See, e.g., J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 133–35 (2001) 
(noting that the Plant Patent Act was not meant to exclude plant protection under the predecessor to 
section 101, even though plants were not then thought to fall within that provision); Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 311–12 (1980) (noting that before 1930, artificially bred plants were 
thought to be both products of nature and incapable of an adequate written description, and that the 
Plant Patent Act changed the view of their status and relaxed the written-description requirement). 
 332. Cf., e.g., Ariad Pharms., 598 F.3d at 1367 (Linn, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) 
(citing In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988)) (noting the current “undue experimentation” 
standard of enablement, requiring commensurability assessments for the making and use of the claim 
by others); see also Sarnoff, supra note 135, at 466–67 (discussing The Incandescent Lamp Patent at 
issue in Consolidated Electric Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co., 159 U.S. 465 (1895), and discussing 
Holland Furniture Co., 277 U.S. 245). 
 333. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of the Federal Circuit Bar Ass’n Urging Reversal, In re 
Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (No. 95-1054), reprinted in 5 Fed. Cir. B.J. 107, 117 (1995) 
(citing Application of Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970)) (encouraging the court to decide 
section 112 definiteness before reaching section 101 eligibility for means-plus-function claims); Wesley 
L. Austin, Software Patents, 7 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 225, 245 (1999) (discussing one claim rejected by 
the PTO for indefiniteness while others were rejected as ineligible for abstractness in In re 
Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1358–60 (Fed. Cir. 1994)); cf. Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft 
Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[A] patent that presents a process sufficient to pass the 
coarse eligibility filter may nonetheless be invalid as indefinite because the invention would ‘not 
provide sufficient particularity and clarity to inform skilled artisans of the bounds of the claim.’” 
(citing Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008))). 
 334. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 (2006); see Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 216 F.3d 1372, 1380 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000) (generally requiring objective evidence, rather than subjective inventor testimony, to assess 
what the applicant regarded as the invention). 
Sarnoff_24 (F. Valdez) (Do Not Delete) 12/5/2011 11:32 PM 
106 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:53 
novelty under section 102; for obviousness under section 103; and under 
section 112 for commensurability of the disclosure of that invention to 
the breadth of claimed exclusion, for conformity to the applicant’s 
subjective understanding, and for precision of claims in supplying public 
understanding and notice. Claimed noncreative applications of science, 
nature, and ideas will remain ineligible and unpatentable because they 
are not inventions or discoveries within the meaning of the statute, even 
though they are novel, not inherent in section 102-defined prior art, 
sufficiently described, capable of being made and used by others, and 
limited to what the applicant believed was inventive and clearly claimed 
to supply public notice. Section 101 thus performs a role that sections 102 
and 112 cannot. In contrast, so long as new discoveries are treated as if 
they were prior art, section 103 necessarily should also render ineligible 
uncreative applications unpatentable as obvious. But there are good 
reasons to rely on threshold eligibility determinations rather than 
obviousness decisions to keep these claims out of the patent system. 
III.  The (Mostly) Utilitarian Benefits of Threshold Eligibility 
Exclusions and Clearer Criteria 
Three general kinds of efficiency benefits are provided by applying 
section 101 eligibility criteria as a “threshold” determination.
335
 These are 
reduced costs of administration, reduced overall burdens on the patent 
system, and clearer signals that direct investment and innovation to 
activities that most need patent-system incentives while better protecting 
the public domain of science, nature, and ideas from encroachment.
336
 
Given broader recognition of the prior-art treatment of categorically 
excluded discoveries and the consequent need for invention in their 
application, these benefits should become more transparent. Objections 
to using categorical eligibility rules in a gatekeeping role based on the 
perceived duplication or on the asserted superiority of other patentability 
criteria,
337
 and particularly arguments based on the ability to further 
develop the factual record during search and examination so as to make 
better judgments,
338
 simply fall wide of the mark. And, given recognition 
of the need for invention in the application, so are objections that relying 
 
 335. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 213 
(1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 189–90 (majority opinion) (noting that section 
101 decisions on eligibility are separate from determinations of the “conditions and requirements” of 
patentability). 
 336. See infra Parts III.A.–C. 
 337. See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text; cf. Risch, Forward to the Past, supra note 17, at 
364 (noting arguments for eligibility as a “proxy” for other criteria, and criticizing such arguments for 
failing to provide accurate rules for determining which claims should be disallowed). 
 338. See, e.g., Chisum, supra note 51, at 31. 
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on threshold eligibility determinations will keep out of the patent system 
particular claims or “entire areas of invention” that should be allowed.
339
 
First, because determining the existence of an “invention” is a 
predicate to most subsequent patentability determinations, eliminating at 
the outset claims that lack the minimally required creativity for invention 
is typically an easier and more efficient determination, which will reduce 
overall burdens of evaluation on the patent system. Thus, the practical 
effect of eligibility doctrine could and should be to exclude and 
discourage many claimed applications in fields in which invention 
requires more creativity than is routinely supplied.
340
 Making such 
threshold eligibility determinations will not result in wasted effort so long 
as resorting to an eligibility determination is not required when rejection 
on other grounds is clearly more efficient.
341
 Second, such eligibility 
determinations will discourage the filing of claims for applications 
reflecting more clearly identified insufficient creativity, which will then 
provide the benefit of reducing the overall burden on the patent system. 
Third, and relatedly, excluding at the threshold insufficiently creative 
claims will send the right signals to direct investment, effort, invention, 
and disclosure towards more creative, and thus also potentially 
patentable, activities. This should lead to more rapid development of the 
prospects marked out by the discovery and disclosure of the categorically 
ineligible science, nature, and ideas.
342
 Each of these sets of benefits is 
briefly discussed below. 
Of course, this only raises the more significant question of whether 
mere applications of new discoveries should be allowed to be patent 
eligible and patentable. Eliminating prior-art treatment of categorically 
excluded discoveries arguably might better encourage the identification 
of such discoveries and consequent development of both creative and 
uncreative applications, providing the public with concrete social 
benefits.
343
 Similarly, the exclusions for science, nature, and ideas might 
 
 339. Lemley et al., supra note 12, at 1342. 
 340. Cf. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3253–55 (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing constitutional concerns 
with granting patents on business methods given arguments against the necessity for further 
encouraging business innovations); supra note 298. 
 341. See, e.g., In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 951 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (noting that there is no 
requirement to address section 101 analysis before rejecting on other grounds, but “given that § 101 is 
a threshold requirement, claims that are clearly drawn to unpatentable subject matter should be 
identified and rejected on that basis”). 
 342. See, e.g., Merges & Nelson, supra note 293, at 843 (providing a theoretical and empirical 
analysis of “whether technical advance proceeds more vigorously and effectively under competition or 
under a regime where one person or organization has a considerable amount of control over 
developments”); id. at 843–44 (“[T]he law should attempt at the margin to favor a competitive 
environment for improvements, rather than an environment dominated by the pioneer firm.”). See 
generally John H. Barton, Patents and Antitrust: A Rethinking in Light of Patent Breadth and 
Sequential Innovation, 65 Antitrust L.J. 449 (1997). 
 343. See, e.g., Lemley et al., supra note 12, at 1329 (“The abstract ideas exception should disallow 
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be abandoned on the belief that centralized rather than decentralized 
development of fundamental discoveries will lead to greater scientific 
and technological progress,
344
 or beliefs that section 101 decisions should 
be based solely on whether the claim “forecloses” (preempts) too much 
“follow-on-invention.”
345
 Such approaches raise more fundamental 
innovation-policy challenges to the eligibility rules of the current patent 
system, and lead to questions about how society will fund the basic 
research and development that currently results in the public domain, 
prior-art treatment of science, nature, and ideas. 
The effects of the patent system on innovation—and of particular 
exclusions from it or of particular levels of protection provided by it—are 
highly uncertain and contested.
346
 Particularly in regard to the issue of 
business method eligibility, two economists recently argued to the 
Supreme Court in Bilski that 
  [e]conomic research has shown that the relationship between patent 
protection and innovation is complex . . . . 
. . . . 
  Economic evidence indicates that the social costs of business 
method patents are significant and the social benefits are small 
compared to those costs. 
. . . . 
  Empirical evidence reveals both negative and positive effects of 
patents on the pace of cumulative innovation. 
. . . . 
There is at present very little evidence to argue that business method 
patents have had a significant effect on the R&D investments of 
financial institutions. 
. . . . 
 
those claims to ideas unmoored to real-world applications.”). 
 344. See, e.g., Risch, Everything Is Patentable, supra note 14, at 591–93. But cf. Chisum, supra note 
51, at 29. (“Who can object to barring patents when all the ‘inventor’ contributes is formulation of an 
abstract idea or discovery of a natural phenomenon?”). See generally John F. Duffy, Rethinking the 
Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 439 (2004); F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property, and 
Intellectual Property: An Unconventional Approach to Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream 
Access, 56 Emory L.J. 327 (2006); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 
20 J.L. & Econ. 265 (1977). 
 345. Lemley et al., supra note 12, at 1329–30; see id. at 1339–41 (discussing industry and claim-
specific factors regarding such preclusion). 
 346. See, e.g., Machlup, supra note 61, at 14, 56, 62, 80; Risch, Everything Is Patentable, supra note 
14, at 594 (“[I]t is simply too hard to identify, let alone measure the effect of subject matter rules on 
innovation.”); Rudolph J.R. Peritz, Patents and Progress: The Economics of Patent Monopoly and Free 
Access 1, 10 (July 21, 2008), available at http://www.nyls.edu/centers/harlan_scholar_centers/ 
institute_for_information_law_and_policy/publications/ (discussing inconclusive studies conducted 
since Fritz Machlup and since Kenneth Arrow’s similarly inconclusive theoretical analysis). See generally 
John R. Thomas, Cong. Research Serv., 7-5700, Current Issues in Patentable Subject Matter: 
Business Methods, Tax Planning Methods, and Genetic Materials 13–15 (2011) (discussing and 
surveying recent analyses and arguments for and against expansive patentable subject matter). 
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Empirical studies indicate that software patents have not stimulated 
software research. 
 . . . . 
There is little evidence that [patents induce firms to disclose inventions 
that would otherwise be kept secret] significant[ly or at all].
347
 
But whatever the merits of these arguments about areas of endeavor, the 
benefits and risks of extending the patent system to fundamental 
knowledge poses more serious concerns. This is because of the breadth 
of potential, and potentially unknown, applications of those discoveries. 
As discussed above, the categorical exclusions for science, nature, 
and ideas were adopted specifically to protect and promote such 
fundamental discoveries; prior-art treatment prevents imposing the costs 
of funding those discoveries on both the uncreative and the creative 
applications that patents on such fundamental knowledge would 
dominate.
348
 Eliminating the categorical exclusions or their prior-art 
status is thus a very high-risk utilitarian innovation strategy. 
Further, innovation policy is not the only, and may not be the most 
significant, value at stake. There is an integral relationship of the 
exclusions for science, nature, and ideas to historic religious beliefs 
regarding nature and the role humans play in understanding and shaping 
it.
349
 As noted above, these concerns may be incommensurable with 
utilitarian morality, but they are no less significant politically.
350
 
Eliminating the categorical exclusions or their prior-art status would 
extend the patent system well beyond its current and already highly 
controversial limits. It might permit patents on nature itself, including 
human biology, or on all sorts of other knowledge for which there may 
be no, or wholly inadequate, substitutes or design-arounds.
351
 It also 
might create the equivalent of patent thickets with a single patent,
352
 no 
matter how creative synthetic biology and bioinformatics, theoretical 
 
 347. Brief Amici Curiae of Professors Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer in Support of 
Respondent at 30–32, 36–38, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964) (citations omitted). 
 348. See supra notes 293–94 and accompanying text. 
 349. See Sarnoff, supra note 48 (discussing why deontological moral concerns continue to matter 
for patent eligibility decisions). 
 350. See supra notes 53–58, 300 and accompanying text. 
 351. See, e.g., State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting 
the incentive to design around patents as an incentive to bring useful innovations to the market); Craig 
A. Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and the Useful Arts, 74 Ind. L.J. 759, 760 (1999) (discussing the 
relationship of design-arounds and competition); supra notes 219–21 and accompanying text. 
 352. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698, 700 (1998) (arguing that the grant of too many 
patents is causing licensing failures). But see, e.g., David E. Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Patent 
Metrics: The Mismeasure of Innovation in the Biotech Patent Debate, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1677, 1679, 1685 
(2007) (discussing data on biotech patents that suggest the lack of anticommons problems). See 
generally Michael A. Heller, The Gridlock Economy: How Too Much Ownership Wrecks 
Markets, Stops Innovation, and Costs Lives (2008). 
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These moral concerns are salient. Congress quickly reversed a 
judicial decision holding that using a patented invention to obtain 
approval for competitive pharmaceuticals infringes the exclusive rights of 
a patent.
354
 Under current experimental-use doctrine, however, there may 
be a gap in legislative protection of the drug development process, 
allowing a patent holder to block medical product research and 
development at the point between nonprohibited basic research and 
excepted medical-approval research.
355
 Further, recent court decisions have 
limited the patent-rights exception to patents on potentially approvable 
materials, rather than to all patented materials (particularly research 
tools), used in such research.
356
 Similarly, Congress reacted quickly to 
protect doctors and hospitals from being sued for infringement of medical 
and surgical method patents,
357
 even if it did not thereby protect patients or 
other medical service providers (who may act as the agents of doctors).
358
 
Prudence, or responsibility, thus counsels against adopting dramatic 
changes to patent eligibility,
359
 given the high risks for innovation policy 
and the religious and moral concerns that would be triggered by 
changing the historic, strong protection for the public domain of science, 
nature, and ideas. Legislative action to further expand (rather than 
contract) the patent system seems unlikely for the present,
360
 even if the 
Supreme Court removes any constitutional restriction on such action,
361
 





 353. For the same reason, the experimental use exception should protect efforts to use disclosed 
knowledge not only to perform basic research on but also research with patented inventions, even 
where physical access to the patented invention (precluded making or use) is needed to do so. See 
Holzapfel & Sarnoff, supra note 270, at 165–66; cf. Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public 
Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 Wis. L. Rev. 81, 86–88 (citing Embrex, Inc. v. 
Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1343–49 (Fed. Cir. 2000)) (discussing concerns with prohibitions on 
using patented inventions in order to design around them). 
 354. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006); Merck KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 
205–08 (2005). 
 355. See, e.g., Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 877 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(Newman, J., dissenting); Brief of Amici Curiae Consumer Project on Technology, Electronic Frontier 
Foundation and Public Knowledge in Support of Petitioner at 2–3, 6–11, 20–30, Merck KGaA v. 
Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005) (No. 03-1237). 
 356. See Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., 536 F.3d 1256, 1262–64 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 357. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2006). 
 358. Cf. Brief Amicus Curiae of AARP in Support of Petitioner at 9–10, Lab. Corp. of Am. 
Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006) (No. 04-607). 
 359. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 360. Cf. supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 361. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 362. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010). 
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A. Reduced Costs of Search and Better Evaluations and 
Disclosures 
Given the requirement to treat new discoveries of science, nature, 
and ideas as if they were prior art, determining the eligibility of claims 
applying such discoveries should be simpler and more efficient than 
determining the patentability of these and other types of claimed 
inventions. This is because the required creativity and other inventive 
concept should—if the applicant has provided the required written 
description of the invention
363
—be apparent from the disclosure in the 
application’s specification. Thus, threshold elimination of claims for 
which the specification discloses an insufficiently creative invention or 
fails to disclose any sufficient one should avoid more detailed scrutiny. 
Facial evaluation of such insufficiency may avoid the need to search for 
prior art and to consider novelty under section 102, given the public-
domain status of the discovery or other disclosed knowledge of its 
inherency. Similarly, it may avoid the need to consider obviousness 
under section 103 (including objective factual indicia thereof).
364
 Facial 
evaluation also may render moot any consideration of the sufficiency of 
the description to demonstrate “possession” of the invention under 
section 112, paragraph 1.
365
 Finding such claims ineligible also may avoid 
enablement-determination errors under section 112, paragraph 1, given 
that commensurability of claim scope may be unclear, but the initial 
burden of establishing a lack of enablement rests on the PTO.
366
 
In contrast, if the disclosure fails to clarify whether the claim 
identifies a sufficiently creative application but the claim is not rejected 
outright for ineligibility or for lack of written description, additional 
system costs must be incurred. These include searches and evaluations to 
determine the point of novelty of the claimed invention as a whole,
367
 in 
light of known or newly discovered but ineligible science, nature, and 
ideas. In such cases, eligibility determinations should be simpler, and 
thus less costly and more accurate, than for most other patentability 
evaluations.
368
 This is because eligibility requires only identifying what 
 
 363. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2006). 
 364. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). 
 365. See Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) 
(“[T]he specification must describe an invention understandable to that skilled artisan and show that 
the inventor actually invented the invention claimed.”). 
 366. See, e.g., In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561–62 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 367. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 368. In contrast, determinations that claims are indefinite under section 112, paragraph 2, may be 
simpler than determinations of eligibility, as the former require assessing only whether the scope of 
the claim is sufficiently intelligible to understand its limits without litigation to impose such limits, 
while the latter require assessing whether that scope corresponds to the claimant’s disclosed inventive 
contribution to the art. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Consumers Union, et al. in Support of 
Defendants-Cross-Appellants at 4–9, Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) 
Sarnoff_24 (F. Valdez) (Do Not Delete) 12/5/2011 11:32 PM 
112 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:53 
the inventions consist of and assessing them for minimal creativity of the 
relevant kind, whereas the existence of such an invention, and of its 
nature, is only a necessary, partial predicate for most other patentability 
determinations.
369
 These other determinations require additional, and, 
given resource constraints, at least equally suspect investigations and 
determinations, but the effort expended in evaluating threshold eligibility 
will not be wasted in making them. 
For example, novelty decisions under section 102 require, in 
addition to identification of the inventive contribution beyond any 
ineligible new discovery, evaluation of the level of its publicity or use by 
the applicant or public access to comparable information invented by 
others.
370
 Both sets of information are needed to determine if the 
applicant should be considered the first person to provide the public with 
the specific contribution claimed.
371
 Similarly, non-obviousness 
determinations under section 103 require, in addition to identification of 
the kind and degree of creative contribution, evaluation of the height of 
the inventive step under potentially more stringent requirements for 
creativity, while also balancing, in some unspecified fashion, objective 
historical and market indicia of non-obviousness,
372
 as well as possibly 
measuring the usefulness of the contribution.
373
 These criteria and 
 
(Nos. 03-1269, 03-1286). 
 369. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“Inventions patentable[:] Whoever invents or discovers 
any . . . subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”); id. § 102 (“A person shall be entitled 
to a patent unless—(a) the invention . . . (b) the invention . . . .”); id. § 103(a) (“A patent may not be 
obtained though the invention . . . .”); id. § 112 ¶ 1 (“The specification shall contain a written 
description of the invention, and of the manner and process of using it . . . .”). 
 370.  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)–(g) (2006). 
 371. See, e.g., Margaret L. Begalle, Eliminating the Totality of the Circumstances Test for the Public 
Use Bar Under Section 102(b) of the Patent Act, 77 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1359, 1359–61 (2002) (discussing 
factors historically affecting public use and on-sale determinations) (citing Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 
525 U.S. 55, 67–68 (1998)); Note, Novelty and Reduction to Practice: Patent Confusion, 75 Yale L.J. 
1194, 1194–96 (1966) (noting the “basic policy” of rewarding only the first inventor to “place the 
[knowledge] in the public domain” so that the knowledge is “made available to the public”). Of 
course, in most novelty determinations under section 102, that is, those other than applications of new 
discoveries of science, nature, and ideas, a substantial part of the applicant’s contribution to public 
knowledge will not be treated as prior art. But once the search for third-party art is performed and an 
assessment has been made that it is in the public domain (after considering evidence regarding the 
dates of invention and filing), the determination of the applicant’s creative contribution is comparable 
to the first step of the eligibility evaluation. Unlike for eligibility evaluation, however, under section 
102 no assessment of sufficient creativity is needed. Rather, section 102 requires further assessment of 
whether (at the time of filing) that prior art was enabling of at least one embodiment of the claim. See, 
e.g., Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharm., Inc., 468 F.3d 1366, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Sean B. 
Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60 Duke L.J. 919, 932–36 (2011). 
 372. See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416–27 (2007) (discussing different 
approaches to assessing obviousness); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966) (discussing 
comparisons to prior art, evaluation of contribution, and objective indicia of non-obviousness); see also 
Sarnoff, supra note 320, at 1003–07, 1036–43 (discussing presumptions generally and the effects of the 
KSR decision on obviousness evaluations). 
 373. See, e.g., Risch, New Uses for Patent Utility, supra note 32, at 21 (“Usefulness is a potential 
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measures are not self-evident and also require search and complex 
evaluations. Written-description and enablement decisions under section 
112 require evaluating the comparability of the identified creative 
contribution to the scope of exclusion that the claims would grant. To do 
so requires objectively assessing from the disclosure either subjective 
possession of the applicant of what has been identified as objectively 
claimed, or from the specification and from extrinsic evidence what a 
notionally skilled person would be capable of doing with the information 
under an uncertain standard of experimentation.
374
 
Further, more rigorous application of categorical eligibility 
exclusions and clearer articulation of the required kinds and degrees of 
creativity may induce applicants to supply clearer specifications that 
better disclose the nature of their creative invention, so as to avoid 
rejection on either eligibility or written-description grounds. In turn, this 
may further reduce costs to the patent system, not only of making these 
determinations and other patentability evaluations but also by assisting 
better claim construction decisions. This would help to reduce the 
chilling effects on competition resulting from uncertain claim boundaries 
and to reduce the costs of reexamination and litigation (given clearer 
predictions and bases for judgment).
375
 Applying section 101 more firmly 
and clearly at the threshold thus not only may remove invalid claims 
more efficiently and effectively, but also may reduce overall costs and 
simultaneously improve the quality of the patents that ultimately issue 
from the system. 
Significantly, the most common argument raised against the 
threshold application of eligibility criteria is overbreadth: that they are 
blunt instruments that will preclude the more precise, case-by-case 
evaluations under patentability criteria that would demonstrate that the 
claimed applications are patentable.
376
 But even if this concern were to 
have some force (for example, if eligibility decisions were based on 
innovation policies that categorically excluded particular areas of 
endeavor, rather than on policies that protect the public domain by 
requiring a minimal level of creative invention in the claimed 
application), the efficiency benefits of categorical exclusions might 
nevertheless outweigh the error costs of removing patentable claims 
 
guide for determining whether an invention is a sufficient improvement on the prior art to be 
patentable.”). 
 374. See supra notes 332, 365. 
 375. See, e.g., United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942) (requiring 
claims to “clearly distinguish . . . what went before in the art” and warning against uncertainty that 
“would discourage invention only a little less than” clearly extended patent coverage). See generally 
James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put 
Innovators at Risk (2008). 
 376. See supra notes 16–20, 339 and accompanying text. 
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from the system.
377
 Further, this concern is fully addressed by the 
recognition of the proper relationship between eligibility and 
obviousness. Given prior-art treatment, any application that reflects 
insufficient creativity in the application of science, nature, and ideas 
necessarily should be found obvious and should be unpatentable. There 
thus should be no theoretical error costs of excluding claims at the 
threshold that should be patentable. 
There should also be fewer practical error costs caused by relying on 
eligibility determinations, given that these determinations are 
conceptually simpler and that the prior-art status of new discoveries is 
supplied by the operation of law—when the applicant discloses it—rather 
than by potentially inadequate searching. Given clearer specification of 
the required creativity, it will be very difficult for applicants to game the 
system by hiding from their disclosures any new discoveries that underlie 
the applications they claim. To do so would likely raise questions 
regarding utility and enablement and might negatively impact desired 
claim scope. 
B. Reduced Administrative Burdens from Fewer (Inevitably 
Unpatentable) Applications 
Relying on eligibility determinations should, in theory, discourage 
applications in excluded categories, reducing the overall volume of 
applications in the patent system and thereby conserving scarce 
examination resources. Similarly, clearer ex ante articulation of the 
degree and kind of creativity required for “invention” should discourage 
filing of insufficiently creative applications. Without such clarity, 
questionable applications will continue to be filed that will ultimately be 
found ineligible or unpatentable. Alternatively, they will issue as “bad 
patents,”
378
 based either on errors of examination or on doctrinal criteria 
that should be changed. There are two prominent recent examples that 
highlight both sets of concerns. The first is the PTO’s recent change to 
definiteness standards, which allow claims to be found invalid during 
prosecution when they are susceptible to alternative reasonable 
constructions, rather than when “insolubly ambiguous,” as had been the 
 
 377. Cf. Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property 
Law, 55 Am. U. L. Rev. 845, 848–50 (2006) (discussing uniformity costs and the increasing need for 
tailoring approaches); Duffy, supra note 11, at 613 (noting the potential for doctrinal eligibility 
changes to exclude “whole fields of endeavor” while obviousness, enablement, and the doctrine of 
equivalents would recognize the “marginal quality” of such claims). 
 378. The definition of “bad patents” is ambiguous, alternatively reflecting beliefs that such patents 
should not properly have issued and beliefs that such patents properly issued but under insufficiently 
rigorous patentability criteria. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley et al., What to Do About Bad Patents, 
Regulation, Winter 2005–2006, at 10, 12 (noting that three-fourths of applications ultimately issue as 
patents and focusing on the difficulty of proving invalidity of issued patents); id. at 12 (discussing 
obtaining rights “broader than what they deserve” without explicit reference to validity). 
Sarnoff_24 (F. Valdez) (Do Not Delete)  12/5/2011 11:32 PM 
December 2011]             PATENT-ELIGIBLE INVENTIONS AFTER BILSKI 115 
prior standard in prosecution and remains the standard in infringement 
litigation.
379
 The second is the more rigorous non-obviousness doctrine 
resulting from a recent Supreme Court decision, rejecting the Federal 




There are many potential private benefits to be obtained by 
applicants from erroneous patentability decisions or from uncertain 
validity,
381
 which often may outweigh the costs of preparing and 
submitting applications. The benefits to the patent holder of acquiring 
invalid, questionable, or doctrinally bad patents should pose even 
broader social welfare concerns than the costs resulting from the lack of 
clarity over the uncertain scope of validly granted rights, which provide 
private benefits to patent holders by chilling sequential innovation and 
competition.
382
 No meaningful sanctions exist to deter applicants from 
seeking and obtaining claims to which they ultimately are not found to be 
entitled. So long as they are not successfully sued—typically in the form 
of counterclaims—for fraud in obtaining such claims or for having 
affirmatively asserted claims that were known to be invalid,
383
 applicants 
will retain any pre-invalidation benefits without incurring any liability 
beyond the sunk costs of prosecution and maintenance. This is true even 
if they are found to have engaged only in inequitable conduct when 
obtaining the patents.
384




Unless barred at the threshold, such erroneously granted claims will 
chill innovation more broadly than will claims of uncertain scope, due to 
their “unequivocal foreclosure of the field.”
386
 Without clearer eligibility 
guidance, moreover, under the current conditions of inadequate or 
uncertain search and examination, the benefits to be obtained from such 
erroneously granted patents assure that they will continue to be filed. 
Presumably for this reason, among others, the Supreme Court in Bilski 
 
 379. See Ex Parte Miyazaki, No. 2007-3300, 2008 WL 5105055, at *4–6 (B.P.A.I. Nov. 19, 2008) 
(distinguishing Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 380. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 407, 419–22 (2007) (rejecting the approach of, 
for example, Al-Site Corp. v VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1323–24 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 381. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. Econ. Persp. 75 
(2005). 
 382. See, e.g., supra note 375 and accompanying text; see also Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 
668–75 (1969) (prohibiting licensee estoppel). But cf. Carroll, supra note 297, at 1425 (noting 
prosecution and enforcement costs that may render the expected value of patents too low to warrant 
investment in innovation or patenting). 
 383. See, e.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174 (1965); 
Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 987–88 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 384. See, e.g., Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1285–87 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). 
 385. See, e.g., Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 38 (2006). 
 386. United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942). 
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invited the Federal Circuit to specify narrower categories or classes of 
abstract ideas—that is, clearer “rules,” although clearer “standards” 
would also be helpful
387
—that would provide the public with greater 
certainty of what can qualify as eligible and what cannot.
388
 This would in 
turn reduce applications for both ineligible and unpatentable claims, and 
preserve or expand claims that reflect greater creativity. It would 
therefore reduce administrative costs by wholly eliminating unnecessary 
eligibility and patentability evaluations, and by further reducing the costs 
of the eligibility and patentability determinations that remained, as the 
requisite creativity or lack thereof would be more transparent from the 
specification. 
By providing greater clarity regarding the required kinds and 
degrees of creativity, the courts would also allow for better private 
ordering, which would result in better public decisionmaking and greater 
system efficiency. The greater clarity around the eligibility of such claims 
in turn might potentially reduce additional social costs associated with 
private decisionmaking and transactions.
389
 
It is widely recognized that the existing patent system is 
overburdened with applications that should not be filed, resulting both in 
substantial processing delays and in grants that are erroneous because 
they are invalid; many such patents would not issue on either eligibility 
or patentability grounds if there were more and better use of search and 
examination resources.
390
 Given the increasing number of applications 
filed, and even with more resources being put into search and 
examination, the problems of delay and perhaps also of quality—in the 
sense of invalidly granted patents—are not improving.
391
 These wrongly 
 
 387. See, e.g., Chisum, supra note 51, at 30 (criticizing the Court’s limited provision of a “clue” as 
an inadequate development of “tests or standards” appropriate “to resolve serious legal questions”); 
Lemley et al., supra note 12, at 1316 (“The [Bilski] result was a (narrow) victory for inventors, as well 
as for context-specific standards over formal rules.”). See generally Duffy, supra note 11. 
 388. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229 (2010). 
 389. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 297, at 1429 (discussing the relationships between complexity, 
default property rules, and the administrative costs of licensing and litigation). 
 390. See, e.g., Matthew Sag & Kurt Rohde, Patent Reform and Differential Impact, 8 Minn. J. L. 
Sci. & Tech. 1, 16 (2007); see also Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examining Patent Examination, 
2010 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 2, 2–3; Warren K. Mabey, Jr., Deconstructing the Patent Application Backlog, 
92 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 208, 212–13 (2010). But cf. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at 
the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1495, 1497 (2001) (arguing that additional search and examination 
resources should not be spent on the large numbers of applications that result in patents that will 
never be developed into commercial applications or asserted against third parties); see also Sarnoff, 
supra note 320, at 1050–52. See generally John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on 
the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185 (1998). 
 391. See, e.g., U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Performance and Accountability Report: 
Fiscal Year 2009–2010 tbl.1–3 (2009) (reporting a thirty-seven percent increase in filings between 
2003 and 2009); John Schmid, Despite Efforts To Improve, U.S. Patent Approvals Move Slower, 
Milwaukee-Wis. J. Sentinel Online, Jan. 16, 2011, http://www.jsonline.com/watchdog/watchdogreports/ 
113830084.html (noting that even with faster processing to supply first office actions, pending 
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issued patents impose increasingly great social costs as reflected in the 
results of reexaminations,
392
 which are exacerbated by the difficulty of 




In sum, by applying categorical exclusions more consistently and by 
providing greater clarity regarding the required creativity in the 
application, fewer invalid applications should be filed and fewer invalid 
patents should issue. The patent system thus should be less burdened 
with the wasted costs of evaluating applications, or of having to 
reexamine or litigate granted patents that should have been rejected 
initially on eligibility or subsequently on patentability grounds. This will 
allow the limited administrative and judicial resources that exist to be 
directed to search and examination, and to reexamination and litigation, 
of claims that are closer to the margins of patentability. In turn, the 
patent system will issue improved quality patents, providing additional 
social benefits including reduction of the chills to innovation and 
competition that such improperly granted patents impose. 
C. Direction of Investment, Effort, Invention, and Disclosure 
Towards More Creative Applications 
By consistently applying the section 101 categorical exclusions and 
more clearly articulating the requirement for creativity in the application, 
courts and the PTO will also set the bar higher for prefiling development 
of inventors’ understandings of the useful applications of newly 
discovered science, nature, and ideas. This is because applicants will 
likely undershoot the bar so long as the eligibility threshold remains 
unclear and the private incentives continue to favor seeking patents for 
insufficient creativity. Providing greater clarity thus should direct 
 
applications exceed one million, and that number has not changed significantly in three years); see also 
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, The Patent Crisis and How the Courts Can Solve It 22–30 
(2009) (discussing the “patent flood,” “overburdened PTO,” continuations and reexaminations, and 
“patent holdup and litigation abuse”). 
 392. See, e.g., U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Quarterly Review: Inter Partes 
Reexamination Filing Data Review (2010) (reporting that ninety-two percent of patents litigated in 
inter partes reexamination proceedings are cancelled or amended); U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 
Quarterly Review: Ex Parte Reexamination Filing Data Review (2010) (reporting that between 
seventy-seven and eighty-eight percent of patents prosecuted in ex parte reexamination proceedings 
are cancelled or amended); see also Adam B. Jaffe & Josh Lerner, Innovation and Its Discontents 
35–77 (2004) (discussing erroneously issued patents and their adverse effects on innovation). 
 393. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of 37 Law, Business, and Economics Professors in Support 
Petitioner at 1–6, 15–17, Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011) (No. 10-290). But cf. 
Etan S. Chatlynne, Investigating Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity—An Empirical Analysis, 
2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 37, 43 (suggesting that the heightened evidentiary burden had relatively 
little impact on a narrow sample of validity challenges for obviousness in post-KSR cases). See 
generally Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 381; Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent 
Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 45 (2007). 
Sarnoff_24 (F. Valdez) (Do Not Delete) 12/5/2011 11:32 PM 
118 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:53 
investment, effort, invention, and disclosure towards more creative 
activities, just as a higher non-obviousness threshold induces researchers 
to address more difficult research topics.
394
 In turn, this should direct 
applicants towards more socially beneficial, less obvious or analogous, 
applications.
395
 It should also lead to more informative patent application 
disclosures, which in theory should lead to more rapid and cumulatively 
increased sequential innovation.
396
 As has been recognized in an 
international context, patent law’s requirement for inventive activity sets 
a higher bar than do the corresponding levels of creativity required for 
utility model protection; jurisdictions lacking such utility model 
protections thus direct investment, effort, invention, and disclosures 
towards more creative activities and applications.
397
 
Establishing a higher threshold for invention in the application, by 
clarifying creativity requirements, should also force discoverers of 
science, nature, and ideas to more fully develop their understanding 
before claiming in patent applications that they have made creative, 
patent-eligible, and patentable applications. It will thereby require a 
larger “quid” from the applicant, in terms of practical and beneficial 
applications, in exchange for the “quo” of exclusive rights to be obtained, 
the costs of which the public must pay. There is recent precedent in the 
patent system in both written-description and utility jurisprudence for 
setting a higher bar for the development of patentable applications of 
newly discovered scientific knowledge.
398
 Doing so in regard to subject 
matter should be no more problematic and simultaneously should 
provide the benefits, discussed above, that result from using eligibility as 
a threshold inquiry. 
Establishing a higher threshold for invention in the application also 
should direct research and development towards activities most in need 
 
 394. See, e.g., Michael J. Meurer & Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Carrots and Sticks: A Model of 
Nonobviousness, 12 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 547, 549, 551–57 (2008). 
 395. Cf. Lee, supra note 23, at 663 (arguing that patents that raise the costs of “normal” science 
may induce scientific paradigm shifts); Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, supra note 50, at 31 (“[P]ractical 
utility’s commercialization effects are based on underlying assumptions about the value of disclosure, 
exclusive rights, and simultaneous competing efforts.”). 
 396. See generally Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research 
and the Patent Law, 5 J. Econ. Persp. 29 (1991). 
 397. See, e.g., Uma Sumeransen, Utility Models and Innovation in Developing Countries xi, 
16 (2006) (noting differences between patents and utility models, as well as the potential for the lower 
inventive threshold for utility models to “re-direct[] funds away from innovation or marketing” and to 
“cordon off areas of research”). 
 398. See, e.g., In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (setting a higher bar for utility); see 
also Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966); cf. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 
598 F.3d 1336, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (same for written description). See generally Risch, New 
Uses for Patent Utility, supra note 32, at 13–17 (discussing the need to develop the practical utility of 
inventions, and the effect of timing of such developed understandings on races to the patent office and 
exploitation of patent prospects). 
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of patent protection,
399
 which may not necessarily include the most 
controversial areas of endeavor for patent-eligible subject-matter 
determinations—for example, business methods, software, genetic 
sequences, and, perhaps more debatably, medical diagnostics or 
treatments.
400
 Particularly since passage of the Bayh-Dole Act
401
—which 
required universities and small businesses receiving federal funding and 
seeking title to inventions to subject their employees to assignment 
agreements
402
—it has been argued that the patent-system incentives are 
needed only for, and should apply only to, downstream product 
development rather than to upstream scientific and natural discoveries.
403
 
And it bears noting that many forms of incentives and substantial public 
funding already exist for a great deal of basic research, although 
governmental contributions to research budgets have been decreasing 




 399. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 297, at 1408–10 (discussing intuitions and evidence regarding the 
various types of innovation least in need of patent and copyright incentives); Carroll, supra note 297, 
at 1410–22 (discussing appropriability mechanisms other than patents for incentivizing investment and 
invention); see also Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability 
Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (Or Not) 2 (Nat’l. Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552. 
 400. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010); Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. 
Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 862–63 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative 
Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1349–50 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3027 (2011); Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Compare, e.g., supra notes 
347, 352 and accompanying text, with Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and 
the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1255, 1278 
(2009); Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 
3 Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity (Special Issue) 783 (1987); James E. Bessen, A Comment on 
“Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?” (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper 
No. 06-13, 2006); and Wesley M. Cohen et al., supra note 399. 
 401. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, §§ 200-211, 94 Stat. 3015, 3019-3028 (1980) (codified 
as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–211 (2006)). 
 402. See id.; Bd. of Tr. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 
2188, 2196–99 (2011). 
 403. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai, Evolving Scientific Norms and Intellectual Property Rights: A Reply to 
Kieff, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 707, 710 (2001) (“Significant transaction costs would be likely to arise if rights 
were granted in such upstream biological research as [expressed sequence tags] and single nucleotide 
polymorphisms (SNPs) of unknown function.”); Charles McManis & Sucheol Noh, The Impact of the 
Bayh-Dole Act on Genetic Research and Development: Evaluating the Arguments and Empirical 
Evidence 1 (Wash. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 11-05-04, 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1840639 (“At the heart of the debate are two 
interrelated questions—1) whether granting patents on the results of ‘upstream’ genetic research 
undermines the norms of the biological research community; and 2) whether such patenting promotes 
or retards biomedical innovation, technology transfer, and/or the development of downstream 
commercial products and processes.”). See generally Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole 
Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 L. & Contemp. Probs. 289 (2003). 
 404. See, e.g., John Boswell & James R. Myers, Automated Analysis of the Patent Landscape, 
21 ACCA Docket 72, 87 (2003) (“From 1994 to 2000, private industry increases in R&D funding 
fueled the largest real rise in history in U.S. expenditures on R&D.”); Patrick J. Clemins, Historical 
Trends in Federal R&D, in AAAS Report XXXIV: Research and Development FY 2010, at 25 (Am. 
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These concerns have repeatedly manifested themselves in the 
biotechnology context, raising serious concerns about upstream patents 
that discourage cumulative innovation and simultaneously raising serious 
concerns about changes to the normative belief structures and values that 
underlie the public domain treatment of science, nature, and ideas.
405
 But 
they exist also in regard to business methods and software, for which 
categorical exclusions would likely drive the patent system away from 
basic and upstream research, such as the development of algorithms with 




Given the prior-art treatment of the fruits of such basic research, 
changing the default rules for eligibility in the patent system may impose 
serious costs on sequential innovation and product development, as well 
as on public access to and the price of important technologies. For one of 
the most salient current examples, in the Myriad Genetics case, an 
international consortium was in the process of sequencing the breast 
cancer genome. The gene would have been placed into the public domain 
but for the efforts of Mark Skolnick, who employed access to Mormon 
genealogical records and Utah public health records and used federal 
funds and researcher assistance to more quickly locate the gene and then 
sequence it.
407
 But the location of the gene is clearly a natural phenomenon 
 
Assoc. for the Advancement of Science 2010) (noting recent expenditures bringing research funding as 
compared to gross domestic product back to historic averages); Michael Yamaner, Federal R&D 
Support Shows Little Change in FY 2008, Nat’l Sci. Found. Info Brief 09-320, Sept. 2009 tbl.1 
(showing that federal R&D spending in year 2000 constant dollars has increased slightly since 1990, 
peaking in 2005); cf. Carroll, supra note 297, at 1368 (noting various alternatives for funding creativity, 
including “indirect subsidies through tax expenditure or market regulation through other tax policies, 
or direct spending on innovation either through direct employment or through a system of grants, 
rewards or prizes for creators and inventors”). 
 405. Cf. Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Arti K. Rai, Harnessing and Sharing the Benefits of State-
Sponsored Research: Intellectual Property Rights and Data Sharing in California’s Stem Cell Initiative, 
21 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1187, 1200 (2006) (discussing concerns over restrictions on data and materials 
transfers). But see, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and 
the Norms of Science—A Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 691 (2001). See generally 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in 
Government-Sponsored Research, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1663 (1996); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary 
Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 Yale L.J. 177 (1987); Arti K. Rai, 
Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 77 (1999); Rai, supra note 403.  
 406. See, e.g., Bessen & Meurer, supra note 375, at 201 (“T]he abstractness of software technology 
inherently makes it more difficult to place limits on abstract claims in software patents.”); id. at 203 
(“Patent law assumes that two technologies can be unambiguously determined to be equivalent or 
distinct . . . . Yet for software, this assumption simply does not hold. . . . Of course, not all software 
patents cover algorithms. Some are quite specific and limited in what they claim.”). 
 407. See, e.g., Jordan Paradise, European Opposition to Exclusive Control over Predictive Breast 
Cancer Testing and the Inherent Implications for U.S. Patent Law and Public Policy: A Case Study of 
the Myriad Genetics’ BRCA Patent Controversy, 59 Food & Drug L.J. 133, 143–44 (2004); Bryn 
Williams-Jones, History of a Gene Patent: Tracing the Development and Application of Commercial 
BRCA Testing, 10 Health L.J. 123, 131 (2002); Phyllida Brown & Kurt Kleiner, Patent Row Splits 
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(a medical fact), and once treated as prior art no creativity, particularly 
given the advanced state of genetic technologies, went into isolating the 
DNA for the gene or identifying its sequence.
408
 And even if it were 
treated it as an eligible invention, the prior-art status of the information 
about location and sequence should have made the claim obvious and 
unpatentable, just as the “lead compound” approach using routine 
methods to identify the gene’s function makes pharmaceutical claims 
obvious and unpatentable.
409
 As argued by various medical organizations 
and patient group amici, and as vigorously disputed by various 
biotechnology industry amici, these patents on the immensely important 
and publicly salient breast cancer gene should never have issued and 
debatably have resulted in large—and wholly avoidable—monetary, 
health, and innovation costs to the public.
410
 Seeking to affirmatively 
authorize such patents by eliminating the categorical exclusions or their 
prior-art status would dramatically expand such controversies. 
D. Utilitarian and Deontological Risks of Changing the Current 
Approach 
The most significant argument against the categorical eligibility of 
such basic discoveries is the arguable overbreadth in regard to potentially 
discouraging investment and effort in discovering and disclosing science, 
nature, ideas, particularly given the lack of adequate governmental 
resources in tough economic times to fund basic research.
411
 But this 
 
Breast Cancer Researchers, New Scientist, Sept. 1994, at 4, 4. 
 408. Cf. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595 (1978). (“If we assume that that method was also 
known, as we must under the reasoning in Morse, then respondent’s claim is, in effect, comparable to a 
claim that the formula 2Βr can be usefully applied in determining the circumference of a wheel.”). See 
generally Joseph Sambrook & David W. Russell, Molecular Cloning: A Laboratory Manual (3d 
ed. 2001). 
 409. See, e.g., Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. v. Matrix Labs., Ltd., 619 F.3d 1346, 1352–54 (Fed. Cir. 
2010); Altana Pharma AG v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 999, 1006–09 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Eisai 
Co. Ltd. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., 533 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 410. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 206–11 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(reciting the competing allegations without finding the facts), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 
(Fed. Cir. 2011). Compare Brief for Amici Curiae Am. Med. Ass’n. et al. in Support of Plaintiffs’ 
Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 22–24, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (No. 09 Civ. 4515); Brief for 
Amici Curiae March of Dimes Found. et al. in Support of Plaintiffs at 17–25, Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (No. 09 Civ. 4515); and Brief for Am. Med. Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and Arguing for Affirmance at 2–12, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology 
v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (No. 2010-1406), with Brief Amicus Curiae Biotech. Indus. 
Org. in Support of Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 18–27, 
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (No. 09 Civ. 4515); Brief of Amicus Curiae 
Genetic Alliance in Opposition to Certain Positions of the Plaintiffs at 22–25, Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (No. 09 Civ. 4515); and Brief for Biotech. Indus. Org. and the Ass’n of 
Univ. Tech. Managers as Amici Curiae Supporting Reversal at 20–32, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 
653 F.3d 1329 (No. 2010-1406). 
 411. See, e.g., Paul R. Michel, Leading Citizens: Lead Congress so Congress Will Lead Your 
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concern is addressed by the historical practice and underlying reasons for 
protecting and preserving the public domain of science, nature, and ideas 
free from patent rights, and thus for requiring sufficient creativity in their 
application.
412
 Society has made the decision that basic research and 
development—however paid for—should remain “free to all men and 
reserved exclusively to none,”
413
 which is the common refrain in patent 
eligibility cases involving new discoveries. 
Further, in the context of whether to grant private rights for publicly 
funded invention, the argument has been made that patents are most 
needed for downstream product development and not for upstream 
research and development.
414
 Eliminating upstream restrictions on 
eligibility by eliminating the categorical exclusions and removing the 
requirement for eligibility in their application would raise even more 
strongly the anticommons, holdup, and related concerns for follow-on 
research and innovation, both basic and applied. Changing the current, 
default approach to the eligibility of categorically excluding science, 
nature, and ideas and of treating them as prior art is thus a very high-risk 
innovation-policy strategy. And it would likely cause even more serious 
changes to the scientific norms than those that have taken place since 
enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act.
415
 As those norms change further, 
public resistance to treating discoveries as categorically excluded may 
also weaken. 
Nevertheless, deontological moral norms against subjecting science, 
nature, and ideas to private, patent property rights remain strong, and 
proposing to eliminate the categorical exclusions or their prior-art status 
would generate controversies best avoided. These controversies are 
currently apparent in the political realm, where morality can more 
readily be discussed and legislated, in regard to the expansion of the 
patent system to new fields of endeavor such as cloned organisms and tax 
 
Country, 20 Fed. Cir. B.J. 265, 265–66 (2010) (“Increased public financing for increased investment in 
innovation, however, will be hard to find. Public finance has been nearly exhausted by the cost of two 
concurrent and continuing wars and a decade of fiscal mismanagement, saddling us with a huge annual 
debt payment and annual budget deficits of hundreds of billions of dollars. In this recession when tax 
revenues are down, obtaining even a modest increase in public research and development (‘R&D’) 
funding will be politically difficult, if not impossible. Actually, the challenge will be to avoid cuts in 
government R&D funding.”); cf. Lemley, et al., supra note 12, at 1326 (“The core mission of patent 
law is to create incentives for the production, disclosure, and commercialization of socially valuable 
inventions.”). 
 412. See supra notes 271–301 and accompanying text. 
 413. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
 414. See supra note 403 and accompanying text. 
 415. See Joshua D. Sarnoff & Christopher M. Holman, Recent Developments Affecting the 
Enforcement, Procurement, and Licensing of Research Tool Patents, 23 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1299, 
1320–27 (2008) (discussing studies of changes to scientists’ research practices based on changes in the 
patent system); supra notes 403, 405 and accompanying text. 
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strategies.
416
 In the case of extension of the patent system to medical and 
surgical methods of diagnosis and treatment, advocates for expansion 
won the eligibility battle but lost the rights war, at least in the United 
States, as Congress limited the scope of infringement liability to avoid 
subjecting medical practitioners and their institutions to the 
consequences of granting any such patents.
417
 
These normative disputes over extending the patent system will be 
even more polarizing when created by judicial decisions, particularly as 
there may be a one-way ratchet effect: Congress may not be able to 
retrospectively reverse the effects of the court decisions that extend 
eligibility without potentially generating takings liability,
418
 which may 
further undermine the political ability of opponents of the court decision 
to obtain legislation that does so. In contrast, Congress can readily 
extend eligibility prospectively or retrospectively where the courts have 
restricted it, without creating a taking,
419
 although some constitutional 
question remains regarding whether particular inventions that have 
entered the public domain as a result of the restriction can again receive 
protection.
420
 Given the long time frames for patents (though they are 
shorter than those for copyrights),
421
 future beneficiaries of restoring 
earlier limits to eligibility are less likely to come forward to engage in the 
legislative or judicial arenas. In turn, this one-way ratchet effect of 
retrospective legislative repeal only of judicial restrictions tends to 
promote uncertainty and continuing expansion of the patent system 




 416. See supra notes 56, 57 and accompanying text. 
 417. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2006). Lacking a sufficiently powerful and organized lobby, patients 
(that is, the entire general public) remain potentially liable. Most of the rest of the world simply 
excludes such claims from eligibility. See, e.g., Convention on the Grant of European Patents, supra 
note 198, at art. 53(c) (creating an exception to patentability that prohibits the grant of a patent, rather 
than creating an exclusion from the definition of invention). Nevertheless, patients themselves are not 
covered, and indirect liability may still give such patents force (and raise First Amendment free speech 
concerns). Cf. Brief Amicus Curiae of AARP in Support of Petitioner at 7–8, Lab. Corp. of Am. 
Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006) (No. 04-607); Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 
79 Tex. L. Rev. 99, 115–17, 136–54 (2000). 
 418. See supra note 314 and accompanying text. 
 419. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2602–04 
(2010) (discussing judicial takings). 
 420. See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (2011). 
Compare Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (“Congress may not authorize the issuance 
of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free 
access to materials already available.”), with Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 203 (2002) (noting, in 
the context of extending the term of subsisting copyrights, that the validity of issued patents may 
depend on retrospective legislation, and citing McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202, 206 (1843), 
which had upheld the validity of a patent that was invalid under the law at the time of its grant but 
validated by subsequent legislation). 
 421. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006), with 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006). 
 422. Cf. Duffy, supra note 11, at 613–14 (discussing the benefits of less clear but more durable 
approaches to eligibility, given the need for doctrinal stability over the two-decade time frame of 
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Finally, controversies over the morality of the patent system’s 
application to controversial subject matter may tend to bring the patent 
system into disrepute, notwithstanding its less controversial benefits. This 
would detract from the ability to acquire sufficient government funds and 
adequately trained personnel to manage the many needs that already 
exist within the system. Thus, avoiding dramatic changes to eligibility 
doctrine should help to improve the patent system’s function and to 
generate greater consensus over the benefits that it may provide. To the 
extent that proponents of expansion ultimately wish to be successful, 
they may be better off treading slowly and hoping that the normative 
shifts away from protecting the public domain will make the hoped-for 
transition more feasible and less controversial at some time in the future. 
It may be impossible to demonstrate theoretically and empirically 
that the historical approach is a better innovation and moral policy than 
is limiting eligibility doctrine and permitting patents on uncreative, 
limited applications of newly discovered science, nature, and ideas—or 
than is congressionally or judicially legislating eligibility criteria out of 
existence. But the burden of proof is on advocates of change. As Fritz 
Machlup noted over fifty years ago, given that this approach has been 
our practice it would be irresponsible to propose changing it without 
more evidence to support the change, as much as if it had not been our 




The Supreme Court in Bilski v. Kappos has placed continued 
emphasis and required greater focus on patentable subject-matter 
eligibility,
424
 and we will continue to flounder unless and until a coherent 
theory is provided for why eligibility matters and what eligibility doctrine 
is really about. The Federal Circuit, in Research Corporation Technologies, 
and various scholars have articulated their reluctance to use patentable 
subject-matter eligibility doctrines to restrict access to the patent system.
425
 
For the many reasons discussed above, this reluctance is unjustified so long 
as we continue to believe in a robust public domain of science, nature, and 
ideas and seek to protect it from encroachment by requiring additional and 
different creativity as the quid pro quo for entry into the patent system. 
It is the more fundamental question of whether to have and to 
protect such a public domain at all, and the strong views that are held on 
that issue, that actually generate the heat surrounding the narrower, 
doctrinal, patentable subject-matter eligibility issues. Although 
 
issued patents). 
 423. Machlup, supra note 61, at 80. 
 424. See 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 425. See Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, (Fed. Cir. 2010); supra notes 
11–15 and accompanying text. 
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theoretically ambiguous, our history and legal doctrine continue to 
reflect strong commitments to the public domain of science, nature, and 
ideas. In contrast, our current normative and political beliefs appear less 
certain and more polarized regarding whether to continue with these 
commitments.
426
 Given the long-standing and controversial history of 
private property encroachments on the commons,
427
 it should be no 
surprise that eligibility disputes are both contested and hot. 
Restricting eligibility doctrine and lowering the creative threshold 
are correctly perceived as attacks on the public domain and to those 
historic beliefs. Wholly eliminating reliance on patentable subject-matter 
eligibility, moreover, would represent a scorched-earth strategy, 
particularly if combined with efforts to eliminate the prior-art treatment 
of science, nature, and ideas from patentability evaluations as well as 
from eligibility determinations.
428
 Conversely, to those who believe in 
using private property to motivate creative advance, using eligibility 
determinations to restrict access to the patent system is the bomb that 
threatens our future viability.
429
 For the reasons discussed above, I 




 426. See Kieff, supra note 405, at 695 (“[T]he breakdown in prescriptive norms that Rai attributes 
to patents in the post-1980 basic biological research community actually occurred well before 1980 as a 
result of several factors other than patents, which were largely unavailable in that community before 
1980.”); supra note 426 and accompanying text. 
 427. See, e.g., James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public 
Domain, 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 33, 33–36 (2003) (discussing the historic enclosure of the public 
domain in land commons); id. at 40 (“Once again, the critics and proponents of enclosure are locked in 
battle, hurling at each other incommensurable claims about innovation, efficiency, traditional values, 
the boundaries of the market, the saving of lives, the loss of familiar liberties. Once again, opposition 
to enclosure is portrayed as economically illiterate . . . .”). See generally James Boyle, The Public 
Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind (2008). 
 428. Cf. Boyle, supra note 427, at 52 (“Like the environment, the public domain must be ‘invented’ 
before it is saved.”). 
 429. Cf. Risch, Everything Is Patentable, supra note 14, at 658 (comparing eligibility exclusions to a 
“machete” that “eliminat[es] broad swaths of innovation,” while patentability criteria are a “scalpel”). 
 430. See Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb (Columbia 
Pictures 1964) (with apologies). 
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